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ABSTRACT  
 This dissertation contains three studies on competitive dynamics within digital 
platforms. All of my three essays focus on platform complementors (producers of 
complementary products to the platform) and their competitive landscape within the 
platform. The empirical settings of my dissertation are based on novel datasets that I 
constructed from multiple sources in the context of the U.S. leading mobile platforms.  
 The first study investigates the factors associated with performance in digital 
platforms’ complementor markets, focusing on two product strategies: a) the extent to 
which complementors imitate features from competitors’ products and b) their reaction 
speed to changes introduced by the platform owner. The paper suggests an inverted U-
shaped relationship between imitation and performance. The analysis also finds that the 
speed by which complementors react to owner-induced changes is positively associated 
with product performance. The paper further identifies platform-wide contingent factors 
which moderate the hypothesized relationships. 
 The second study explores the coopetitive dynamics within a platform. The paper 
explores under-researched competitive dynamics between a platform owner and its 
complementors, focusing on an owner’s entry into its complementors’ product space – a 
 
vii 
phenomenon termed as intra-platform envelopment in this paper. The analysis shows that 
the overall effect of intra-platform envelopment on complementor performance is 
negative with a pooled data of Apple and Google platforms together. However, 
interesting divergent effects are found when analyzing each platform separately. These 
differences can be explained by idiosyncratic platform characteristics, particularly 
differences in the way that platform owners implemented their intra-platform 
envelopment actions. Further, the effect of these actions is found to vary not only across 
platforms, but with complementor-specific characteristics within a given platform.  
 The third study investigates platform complementors’ strategic decision process 
of innovation adoption within the platform. The paper conceptualizes and empirically 
shows how competitive rivalry shapes platform entrepreneurs’ propensity to adopt 
innovation brought by the platform owner – that is, a rule-setter of the institution. The 
analysis finds that competition generally discourages adoption. The adoption by peer 
rivals has an inverted U-shaped effect on adoption likelihood where decreasing curve is 
driven by competitive rivalry, and competition from the institutional rule-setter 
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Increasingly, competition is now moving to digital platforms, such as mobile platforms of 
Apple iOS App Store and Google Play App Store, online market places of Amazon.com 
and Etsy.com, or social media platforms of Facebook and Instagram. Digital platforms 
are booming in our modern economy, dominating industry after industry, region after 
region, and market after market. For instance, Amazon reached 178 billion U.S. dollars in 
net revenue as of 20171, and Alibaba’s historical growth rate has been on average 50% 
for the past five years2. Also, the number of social media platform users worldwide is 
over 3 billion in 2018, boasting a high penetration rate of 42%3. This trend will continue: 
according to the IDC report, more than 50% of large enterprises and more than 80% of 
enterprises with advanced digital transformation strategies are expected to create 
platforms by 20184. In particular, digital platforms have paved the way for the emergence 
and growth of entrepreneurial businesses and individual entrepreneurs, expectedly 
creating over 10 million youth jobs in leading countries.  
 Accordingly, scholars in various disciplines have started paying their attention to 
platform-based ecosystems, particularly in the fields of economics, strategic 
management, entrepreneurship, and technology & innovation management. Some argue 
that platforms are interesting contexts, in which many of the exiting theories can revisited 










and recombined. Others even suggest that platforms, going beyond just intriguing 
empirical phenomenon, be viewed as a formal stream of theory.  
 What makes platforms distinct from traditional markets is the fact that platforms 
are comprised of multiple parties that are highly interdependent with each other: the 
platform owner, producers of complementary products to the platform (often referred as 
platform complementors), and end users. However, it is no exaggeration to say that a 
large part of the extant studies on platforms have primarily focused on platform owners 
and their competition and success against other rival platforms: e.g., platform openness 
(Boudreau, 2010; West, 2003), platform entry strategy (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Suarez 
and Kirtley, 2012; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012), platform innovation (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2002; Gawer and Henderson, 2007), and platform governance strategy (Boudreau and 
Hagiu, 2009; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Those studies have tended to take the perspective 
of platform owners, even when seeking for implications for other parties of platforms 
including platform complementors.   
 The number of platform complementors tends to be enormous in digital platforms. 
This is because a wide variety of complementary products are important for the success 
of the platform, as they can bring more consumers on board via indirect network effects 
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2009). Therefore, platform owners strive to induce a 
large number of platform complementors to join their platform, often providing a range 
of offerings that can facilitate the development and distribution of complementary 
products (Boudreau, 2012): e.g., through the form of application programming interfaces 





highly crowded market with many new entrants coming into (and exiting out of) the 
market. For instance, the Apple iOS App Store alone is estimated to grow by 200,000 
new applications per month. Since its inception in 2008, the total number of available 
apps in the app store has surpassed two million as of 2016. Such offerings that platform 
owners present significantly contribute to lowering the entry barriers for platform 
complementors, which are particularly important for entrepreneurial firms and individual 
entrepreneurs who often suffer from the liabilities of smallness and newness 
(Stinchcome, 1965).  
 Recently, a small but fledging body of scholars have started focusing on platform 
complementors and their competitive dynamics within the platform ecosystem as a key 
construct of their research (e.g., Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Rietveld and Eggers, 2017). 
My dissertation, which is comprised of three studies, aims to join this emerging stream of 
research by focusing on within-platform competitive dynamics and taking the perspective 
of platform complementors. Empirically, I examine these issues in the context of mobile 
platforms – an exemplary case of digital platforms. I constructed large-scale novel 
datasets from multiple sources on the U.S. Apple iOS and Google Play app stores. These 
are two leading mobile platforms, Apple taking the lead in the U.S. market while two 
fiercely competing against each other. As a supplementary analysis, I also conducted 
extensive qualitative examination in order to better understand the context and triangulate 
my findings. For example, I analyzed qualitative accounts from archival data, such as 
online blogs, developer forums, and new clippings for content analysis. I also conducted 





with industry experts, mobile app developers, and other scholars in the field who study 
platforms.  
In Chapter 2, a joint work with Dr. Fernando F. Suarez, we focus on the factors 
associated with performance in digital platforms’ complementor markets. Platform 
complementor markets have unique characteristics, have been relatively underexplored, 
and continue to grow fast. We argue that in these markets, in addition to traditional 
success factors, two product strategies are particularly important: the extent to which 
complementors imitate features from competitors’ products, and their reaction speed to 
changes introduced by the platform owner. Our analysis, using health and fitness 
applications in the Apple iOS App Store, suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between imitation and performance. We also find that the speed by which complementors 
react to owner-induced changes is positively associated with product performance. We 
identify platform-wide contingent factors, such as endorsement from the platform owner 
and prior experience in the platform, which moderate the hypothesized relationships. 
 Chapter 3, a collaboration work with Dr. Fernando F. Suarez, explores under-
researched competitive dynamics between a platform owner and its complementors. 
More specifically, we examine an owner’s entry into its complementors’ product space – 
a phenomenon we term intra-platform envelopment. Our empirical setting is health and 
fitness app ecosystems in the Apple iOS and Google Android platforms. Using a hand-
collected dataset, we show that the overall effect of intra-platform envelopment on 
complementor performance is, as expected, negative. However, we find divergent effects 





platform envelopment continues to be negative, whereas for Google the effect is reversed. 
We argue that these differences can be explained by idiosyncratic platform 
characteristics, particularly the differences in the way that Apple and Google 
implemented their intra-platform envelopment actions. We find that the effect of these 
actions varies not only across platforms, but also with complementor-specific 
characteristics within a given platform. Our results suggest ways in which complementors 
can better cope with competitive actions from the platform owners. 
 In Chapter 4, I investigate complementors’ strategic decision process of 
innovation adoption in digital platforms, when the innovation is introduced by the 
platform owner who competes against its complementors. The adoption of innovation is a 
central topic in institutional theory. However, institutional scholars have tended to 
examine innovation adoption without considering the competitive consequences adoption 
might have among rivals. This is surprising given the attention paid to competitive 
dynamics in strategy literature and the impact that competition has on many other aspects 
of firm behaviors like market entry or diversification. Drawing on a unique dataset in the 
context of the U.S. health and fitness mobile ecosystem in the Apple iOS App Store, I 
address this question by exploring how competitive rivalry shapes platform 
complementors’ propensity to adopt an innovation introduced by the platform owner – 
that is, the institutions’ rule-setter. I find that competition generally discourages adoption. 
More specifically, I show that adoption by peer rivals has an inverted U-shaped effect on 
a focal firm’s likelihood of adoption. Furthermore, competition from the institution’s 





literature by integrating competitive considerations into the theory of how institutional 
pressures affect innovation adoption. Also, this study enhances our understanding of how 
competition within the platform affects the complementors’ adoption of innovation.  
 Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation by briefly synthesizing my findings, 
summarizing contributions to the relevant literatures, and suggesting potential directions 





CHAPTER 2  
COMPETING IN PLATFORM COMPLEMENTOR MARKETS: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE APPLE iOS APP STORE  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This paper focuses on the relatively underexplored topic of the determinants of 
complementor success in digital platforms. While the emergence and diffusion of 
platform markets have been widely proclaimed (Eisenmann et al., 2006, 2011; Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002; Rysman, 2009), much of that work has focused on battles between 
platform owners, such as Apple versus Google in the mobile industry (Cennamo and 
Santalo, 2013; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Zhu and Iansiti, 
2012). Our focus, on the competitive dynamics within a platform – i.e., competition 
among a platform’s complementors, has received significantly less attention (McIntyre 
and Srinivasan, 2017; Selander et al., 2013). A focus on complementors brings new 
insights to our understanding of competitive dynamics in technology markets because, as 
we note below, platform complementor markets present unique characteristics. As 
platforms continue to grow in importance for our economies (Parker et al., 2016) and as 
their complementor markets continue to attract thousands of entrepreneurs and 
established firms, it is important to better understand the characteristics and drivers of 
success in these new, fast-changing markets. 
 Several distinct characteristics make complementor markets in digital platforms a 
particularly interesting context to study competitive dynamics. First, they typically have 





2014; Yoo et al., 2012). Platform owners (e.g., Facebook) provide tools and incentives 
for complementors to enter in order to boost the platform’s indirect network effects (Katz 
and Shapiro, 1994; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Second, complementor market spaces are 
fast moving and often boast a very large number of competitors (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2002): a multitude of individual entrepreneurs, small startups, and established 
corporations enter these markets every year. This results in thousands or tens of 
thousands of competing products in every category. Third, intellectual property (IP) 
protection for complementors in this context is rather weak, and most players do not have 
the resources or the time to seek or enforce IP rights. Fourth, unlike most traditional 
markets, these “markets within a platform” actually have a “master”; namely, the 
platform owner, which acts as a regulator by designing and enforcing the rules of 
engagement (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Claussen et al., 2013). Complementors’ 
freedom in product design is therefore limited by the rules, standards, and “look-and-
feel” guidelines imposed by the platform owner.  
 In traditional product markets, success has often been associated with innovation, 
particularly of the radical or disruptive kind (Christensen, 1997; Schumpeter, 1942), and 
with efficiency in operations that allows a player to compete on price (Porter, 1980). 
However, the unique characteristics of complementor markets in digital platforms, such 
as those in third-party applications (apps) for smartphones, conforms to an environment 
in which other competitive strategies seem to be important for success. To begin, most of 
the products in these markets are offered to customers free of charge, so price is often not 





traditional markets because of the guidelines and restrictions imposed by the platform 
owner. Extremely high rates of entry due to low entry barriers, and the fact that the 
technology and user experience is largely controlled by the platform owner implies that, 
for most complementors, successful competition in a particular category seems to rely on 
their ability to imitate the most salient features out of an extremely large number of 
market offerings and to their ability to react quickly to owner-prompted changes in the 
platform technology or conditions. 
 In this paper, we provide a detailed empirical analysis of how complementors in 
mobile platforms navigate the competitive landscape for success. We first focus on the 
role of imitation. Interestingly, much of the literature in strategy and innovation that has 
looked at imitation has done it with a very different perspective in mind, being 
preoccupied mainly with imitation deterrence. The resource-based view literature 
(Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001) emphasizes inimitability as a prerequisite for 
resources to provide a sustained superior performance. First-mover advantage 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988, 2013) and intellectual property (DeBrock, 1985; 
Gallini, 1992) literatures are also concerned with establishing barriers to imitation by 
entering a market early and preempting resources over imitators or via legal protection. 
However, in platform complementor markets, the focus of most players is not on building 
barriers to imitation: the speed of change and sheer number of players would make that 
endeavor futile. We therefore revisit the implicit assumption in existing literature that 
imitation is something to be avoided and deterred. We also challenge the idea that 





common operationalization of the construct in extant literature. We theorize about and 
empirically explore the relationship between imitation and performance at the product 
feature level, which allows us to measure different levels of imitation. 
 Next, we focus on how fast complementors react to changes in their context that 
are introduced by a unique player whose actions have far-reaching consequences in the 
market: the platform owner. Given that complementor markets in digital platforms move 
at a very high clockspeed (Fine, 1998) experiencing rapid growth in the number of 
competitors and users, platform owners regularly introduce major changes in the 
underlying platform technology or rules of the game that affect a large number of 
complementors. Strategy and innovation scholars have typically focused on how firms 
react to or anticipate competitor moves in the market (Ethiraj and Zhu, 2008; Ross and 
Sharapov, 2015). For instance, time-based competition research has shown that a firm’s 
ability to react to the new products introduced by rivals or to beat competitors in the 
development of new products, is crucial in fast-changing contexts (Carrillo, 2005; Souza 
et al., 2004). However, in platform markets, due to the platform owners’ role as creators, 
masters, and regulators of the complementor market, they weld unusually large power 
and influence over the market actors. Hence, the reaction speed to major changes 
introduced by platform owners can become an important competitive factor for 
complementors. 
 The setting for this study is the health and fitness category in the Apple iOS app 
store. The iOS app store is one of the two dominant mobile app platforms in the U.S., and 





over 150 percent since its inception, and regular technology improvements5. We use a 
hand-collected dataset of health and fitness apps in the U.S. iOS app store during the time 
period of January to December 2013. Health and fitness is representative of the Apple 
iOS app store because it is the ninth largest category in the store (out of 25), it is not 
heavily concentrated, and serves a wide user population. This setting has several 
advantages to explore the effect that complementors’ ability to imitate and react fast to 
industry changes have on performance. Making use of the granularity of our data, we 
perform our analysis at the level of product features and specific technological changes 
that affect the platform. This makes sense for several reasons. First, the most important 
decision-making metrics in this context center around products, the apps; for instance, 
rankings and top charts are measured at the product level. Second, we have taken care to 
collect data that allows us to track in detail what and when specific features are 
introduced and imitated, and when complementors react to platform-wide changes. 
Lastly, the majority of players in the app store tend to be individual developers or small 
organizations that concentrate their resources and efforts on developing one or a few 
applications. These players’ most important decisions or strategies largely center on 
products. For instance, app developers are always scanning the app store to detect small 
improvements or changes that can possibly benefit or affect their products. They 
frequently update their apps, even if only to fix minor issues, based on what they hear 
from customers or observe from the competitors. 
 We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the level of imitation and a 






complementor’s product performance. We also find that a complementor’s ability to 
quickly react to platform changes introduced by the owner is significantly related to the 
performance of its products in the platform complementor market. Both of these 
relationships are in turn moderated by two factors: endorsement from the platform owner 
and a complementor’s prior experience in the platform. Our findings contribute to 
platform literature by focusing on novel dimensions in the underexplored topic of 
complementor competitive strategies, and by providing granular metrics that empirically 
test our hypotheses. We contribute to the literature on imitation by providing a broader, 
more thorough conceptual treatment of the construct, focusing on the performance effects 
of imitation and capturing them at the product feature level. Our focus on the effect on 
complementor performance derived from major changes introduced by a platform owner 
adds visibility to a little explored angle in existing platform literature. Finally, this study 
identifies a few key platform-specific contingencies that affect complementor 
performance. Overall, the present study enhances the field’s understanding of the inner 
workings of platform ecosystems and the determinants of complementor success.  
 
2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.2.1 Competing in digital platforms’ complementor markets 
The existing literature on platforms has largely focused on how platforms compete 
against other platforms (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Suarez and 
Kirtley, 2012). In this body of work, complementors are seen as a source of indirect 





effectively compete against its rival platforms (Clements and Ohashi, 2005; Katz and 
Shapiro, 1994; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). However, many complementor markets in 
digital platforms have become large, dynamic, and present special characteristics that 
make them worthy of study for what we can learn about competitive dynamics. Platform 
complementor markets have low barriers to entry and weak intellectual property 
protection, and therefore can experience an extremely high number of entrants, resulting 
in a very crowded and contested market. For instance, the Apple iOS platform today has 
over two million applications,6 and a similar number of contributing developers7. Even 
the smallest category in the iOS store has more than 30,000 apps as of 20178. Other 
complementor markets, such as those that emerged through platforms such as Facebook, 
Salesforce, and Amazon – have also seen exponential growth with the consequently 
intensified competition. Moreover, in many cases, digital platform complementors are 
small organizations or individual entrepreneurs, including hobbyists or part-time app 
developers (Boudreau and Jeppesen, 2015), who do not possess time or resources to erect 
effective IP protections in an industry that is constantly changing. 
 These characteristics of complementor markets, added to the fact that by 
definition their rules of engagement are set and controlled by a master, bring to the fore 
two factors of competitive dynamics that have received little attention so far in the 
literature. The first is the role of imitation. The sheer number of competitors that exist in 









complementor markets and the fact that innovation is to some extent curtailed by the need 
to comply with the technology standards and “look and feel” guidelines set by the 
platform owner, make imitation particularly important in this setting and in ways that 
have not been previously studied. The second is the role of timely reaction to changes in 
the technology or rules of the game introduced by the platform owner. Researchers have 
previously established that owners do introduce changes to the technical aspects of the 
platform or the rules of engagement that can directly affect or provide new opportunities 
for complementors (Claussen et al., 2013). Most often, platform owners do not give 
complementors much in advance notice or the option to “opt out” of the changes, thus 
timely reacting to these platform-level changes is important for complementors to remain 
relevant in the market. 
2.2.2 Imitation level and performance 
Various bodies of literature so far have studied imitation, but these have largely been 
preoccupied with deterrence (Barney, 1991; DeBrock, 1985; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988). Deterrence is concerned with strategies and resources that 
incumbent players deploy to prevent other players or new entrants from imitating their 
existing products or product features. The fact that perspectives on the performance 
implications of imitation derive from different bodies of literature and focused only on 
deterrence, resulted in a fragmented and incomplete development of the imitation 
construct (Lee and  Zhou, 2012; Lieberman and  Asaba, 2006). Many of the insights we 
have on imitation come from studies that focus primarily on innovation, and define 





imitation, compared to that on innovation, is so far underdeveloped and often inconsistent 
in its views about the relationship between imitation and performance.  
 On the one hand, some scholars stress the benefits of imitation, arguing that it 
helps the imitator to save on expensive development costs, avoid risks associated with 
pioneering markets, or learn from and improve the products launched by the innovators 
or first-movers (Baldwin and  Childs, 1969; Lee et al., 2000; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988). Some of the existing studies have found that imitators often reap 
most of the profits, taking a larger share of the innovation value than an original 
innovator (Shenkar, 2010; Teece, 1986). On the other hand, some scholars point to the 
negative implications of imitation; it can lead to harmfully fierce market competition by 
promoting homogeneity, which can eventually impair the profitability of both the imitator 
and the overall industry (Deephouse, 1999; Odagiri, 1994). These authors claim that 
imitation can also be costly, as there can be irreversible costs if the imitator fails to 
choose the right path or the right set of imitation targets (Barreto and  Baden‐Fuller, 
2006), or lacks the capability to successfully implement imitation (Lieberman and Asaba, 
2006). Basically, authors in this second research stream argue that, although the lure of 
imitation is promising, imitation presents its own set of challenges and is not necessarily 
a shortcut to success. Taken together, these competing views regarding the performance 
implications of imitation call for carefully spelling out the constructs and theoretical 
logics behind the effects of imitation on performance and for subsequent empirical 
validation.  





2012), the extant imitation studies tend to approach the construct as a simple binary 
decision of whether to imitate or not: a player is viewed as either an innovator or an 
imitator. In contrast, we argue that the decision to imitate is one of degrees. For instance, 
when it comes to imitating a product, an imitator could emulate one, a few, most, or all of 
the features of a product that is already on the market. A range of imitation levels is 
possible, and can be conceptualized as the number of product features that are imitated 
from those existing in the market. It is reasonable to expect that varying levels of 
imitation will impact performance to different degrees. Thus, treating imitation as merely 
a dichotomous construct overlooks important granular distinctions and blurs the nuances 
of possible imitation strategies.  
 In this paper, we expect the relationship between imitation level and performance 
to have an inverted U-shape. Given the large number of players in many platform 
complementor markets, resulting in a myriad of product features that can be emulated, at 
any given point it is not easy to choose which products and what specific features to 
imitate. We can thus expect both new entrants and existing complementors to be 
constantly monitoring products and features in the market, particularly in the category 
relevant for their products, deciding which ones are worth imitating based on their 
understanding of which features customers favor. Imitators, naturally, are likely to first 
emulate those features that represent the most value to customers. When complementors 
add features to their products through imitation, two different effects that lead to similar 
outcomes take place. First, from a user perspective, a product that incorporates more 





satisfaction with that product to increase (with the subsequent increase in demand). 
However, this process is not linear: having too many imitated features runs the risk of 
making a product overwhelming and difficult to use, thereby lowering the overall user 
experience and possibly leading to user dissatisfaction and “feature fatigue” (Thompson 
et al., 2005). Second, from a complementor perspective, imitated features can be 
expected to contribute to its business, but will do so at a decreasing rate: not only will 
additional features be less valued by users than previously added relevant features, but in 
addition they represent additional costs for the complementor. The cost of imitating a 
feature can be roughly described as composed of two main elements: the cost of 
replicating the feature itself, and the cost of integrating and coordinating that feature into 
the existing product or system. As research has shown (Novak and Eppinger, 2001; Zhou 
and Wan, 2017), integration and coordination costs increase non-linearly with the 
complexity of the product; in other words, costs increase non-linearly with an increasing 
number of features. Also, a higher number of imitated features will probably originate 
from a higher number of sources– e.g., features coming from a diverse set of products 
and players, which makes the integration and coordination costs significantly higher. 
 The user (complementor) perspectives are illustrated in Figure 2.1. At any given 
time, the first features that are imitated will tend to add the most value to the user 
(complementor) whereas additional imitated features will add value but at a decreasing 
rate. As noted above, on average, complementors will imitate first those features that 
seem to be in highest demand, which produces similar effects from the user and 





features are added, users incur a cost represented by the decrease in usability and user 
experience due to “feature fatigue” and an increased difficulty to learn how to properly 
use the product. From the complementor perspective, as more features are imitated, a 
point is reached where the added technical difficulty of coordinating and integrating 
across all the imitation elements will offset the added value from imitation. This results in 
a product that is either not cost-competitive or that underperforms similar market 
offerings due to a suboptimal product integration, which is likely to adversely affect 
product performance. 
 Figure 2.1 conveys the basic idea of an “optimal level” of imitation. Therefore, 
considering user and complementor perspectives, we hypothesize an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between imitation level and product market performance.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The level of product imitation will have an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with the complementor’s product market performance.  
2.2.3 Reaction to changes introduced by the platform owner and effects on 
performance  
While much of the strategy literature has focused on how firms react to other competitors 
in the market (Carrillo, 2005; Ross and Sharapov, 2015), this literature cannot account for 
one of the core variables affecting firm competition in platforms markets; the platform 
owner. They control the platform’s underlying business model and technology, an 
unusual concentration of power that gives the platform owners “bouncer’s rights” 





it that much easier or harder for complementors to perform and compete. Because 
platform owners provide the critical force that the rest of the platform users need for the 
platform to function, “there will necessarily be an asymmetric one-to-many relationship 
that emerges between the platform owner and surrounding parties” (Boudreau and Hagiu, 
2009). 
 For instance, game-maker Zynga, one of the most successful complementors in 
the Facebook platform, suffered a steep performance decline when Facebook introduced 
some changes in the way they surfaced games in the platform that made it harder for 
Zynga’s users to enjoy the company’s games9. The high level of dependence of 
complementors on the platform owner makes them vulnerable to changes they often 
cannot anticipate. Similarly, Microsoft has used its power to the detriment of developers, 
sometimes changing the conditions in arbitrary ways. An article in Wired Magazine 
reports Xbox developers’ “horror stories” when the platform owner suddenly cancelled 
the release of their games and then forced them to resubmit through an arduous approval 
process and long, protracted negotiations10.  
 We therefore focus on the speed by which complementors react to important 
changes introduced by the platform owner. Reacting quickly allows a complementor to 
respond and adapt to changes in order to mitigate possible damage to its business model 
and/or take advantage of new opportunities brought about by the platform-level change. 
It also gives a complementor the possibility of differentiating itself – albeit temporarily—







from other complementors with similar offerings. 
We therefore suggest that, 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The speed by which a platform complementor reacts to major 
platform-wide changes introduced by the platform owner will be positively 
associated with the complementor’s product market performance. 
2.2.4 Moderating effect: endorsement from the platform owner 
Sometimes platform owners can direct the attention of platform users to particular 
complementor products by displaying them in a prominent location in their platform 
stores. Demonstrating the power held by the platform owner, products that are 
highlighted by the platform in this way can benefit from increased legitimacy (Rao, 1994; 
Stuart et al., 1999; Suchman, 1995), which in turn can boost their performance in the 
focal platform. 
 Legitimacy is an intangible asset that has been associated with the success and 
survival of organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Legitimacy can come through 
endorsements or recognition by powerful organizations (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Scott, 
1987), and has been shown to be particularly important under uncertainty, as it can help 
consumers’ decision-making processes (Bitektine, 2011; Rao, 1994; Zimmerman and 
Zeitz, 2002). For instance, Rao (1994), in the context of the early American automobile 
industry, which was characterized by significant uncertainty, showed that earning 
recognition from credible industry sources, such as Cosmopolitan Magazine and Times-





those automobile manufacturers.  
 Platform complementor markets are also characterized by uncertainty, stemming 
from the vast number of players and high perceived pace of technological change. We 
therefore expect that legitimacy will positively moderate the effect on performance both 
for the complementors’ imitation level and the speed of reaction to changes introduced by 
the platform owner. As for imitation level, endorsement from the platform owner will 
likely mitigate any negative perception that an imitator may experience, and may even 
lead some uninformed consumers to believe that the featured complementor is indeed the 
player that introduced the product features in the first place. For the speed of reaction to 
platform-owner-induced changes, the added visibility from the platform owner will 
probably result in more customers’ learning about the changes made to a focal 
complementor product compared to those made to products that are not featured by the 
platform owner. We therefore argue that, 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The degree to which a complementor’s product is endorsed 
by the platform owner will positively moderate the relationship between the 
complementor’s imitation level and its product market performance. 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The degree to which a complementor’s product is endorsed 
by the platform owner will positively moderate the relationship between the 
complementor’s speed of reaction to changes introduced by the platform owner, 






2.2.5 Moderating effect: prior experience in the platform  
Organizational learning scholars (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Levitt and March, 1988) argue 
that learning can enhance an organization’s performance, in part because accumulated 
experience and knowledge enable them to better codify dynamic market situations and 
cope with uncertainty. For example, it is reasonable to assume that not all imitable 
features add the same value to a product; in this case, when choosing which features are 
worth imitating, a platform complementor’s prior experience in the industry may help to 
interpret market data and signals. Prior industry experience may also help a 
complementor assess the technical difficulties of implementation when deciding how to 
react to changes in the platform that require changes in the complementor’s product. In 
these instances, prior experience may help a complementor to better estimate the time and 
effort that it would take to make the changes or to find ways to shorten the 
implementation cycle.  
 Complementors with prior experience may also have developed stronger networks 
with other market players, which can further assist them in acquiring relevant information 
to make critical decisions (Powell et al., 1996; Silverman and Baum, 2002). Prior 
experience is particularly helpful in settings that are characterized by high specificity, in 
the sense that rules and requirements exist that may not be common in other markets. 
That is, we expect experience in a more closely related market to be more helpful than 
experience in a less related market (Schilling et al., 2003). In this sense, platform markets 
are different from non-platform markets (Parker et al., 2016), and there may also be 





own set of rules and standards. For instance, mobile platforms often have their own 
programming languages optimized for their respective platform environments, as in 
Apple’s Swift and Google’s Go11. Therefore, we expect complementor’s prior experience 
in a given focal platform to play a role that will positively moderate the relationships 
elaborated above,  
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): A complementor’s prior experience in a focal platform 
market will positively moderate the relationship between the complementor’s 
imitation level and its product market performance.  
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): A complementor’s prior experience in a focal platform 
market will positively moderate the relationship between the complementor’s 
speed of reaction to changes introduced by the platform owner and its product 
market performance. 
 
2.3 DATA AND METHOD 
2.3.1 Empirical setting: the Apple iOS app store 
The Apple iOS app store is a leading mobile platform in the market, capturing 56 percent 
of the entire mobile app revenue as of 201612. This context provides an ideal setting in 
which to test our hypotheses for three main reasons.  
 First, the mobile app stores are among the most salient digital platform markets 







today, with a large number of players continuously entering and exiting due to low 
barriers to entry and exit (Basole and Karla, 2012; Boudreau, 2012). In this context, 
Apple, the platform owner, offers a wide array of support and incentives to encourage 
developers to join the iOS platform. For instance, Apple provides free software 
development toolkits and handles the mobile payment process on behalf of app 
developers, which reduces the latter’s costs and administrative requirements (Basole and 
Karla, 2012). As a result, the majority of the players in the app store are individuals or 
small firms. A staggering 12 million developers were active worldwide in mobile 
platforms in 201613, contributing to a frenetic pace of entry and exit that constantly 
blurred market definitions and boundaries. The Apple iOS app store alone is estimated to 
be growing by 200,000 new apps per month14. Since its inception in 2008, the total 
number of available apps has surpassed two million as of 201615.  
 Second, the level of imitation and the speed of reaction to changes introduced by 
the platform owner, key constructs for our analysis, are traceable in this setting. An app 
consists of a multitude of features, and app developers must decide which and how many 
features they will adopt. Applications compete on features, and features can be directly 
traced and compared across apps. When launching or updating an application in the app 
store, a developer has to provide a detailed description of the application and a list of the 
new or updated features. This information is one of the most important ways in which 
developers communicate to potential buyers or stakeholders the features and advantages 
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of their applications, and therefore developers are highly incentivized to provide 
complete information. Apple reviews and approves the contents and changes in app 
descriptions, which provides a further check of the contents and data source.  
 Third, this setting enables us to observe changes in the relative performance of the 
different applications, allowing us to examine the outcome of the different platform 
complementor strategies. Apple publicly releases top ranking charts that can be used to 
measure an app’s market performance relative to that of its competitors. Rankings have 
been used to measure relative performance by scholars in this context (Jung et al., 2012) 
and in other industries, such as ranking charts in box office (Vany and Walls, 1997) and 
billboard charts in the music industry (Bhattacharjee et al., 2007). As Apple does not 
make app downloads or app revenue data available, industry analysts and stakeholders 
rely on rankings data to judge an app’s success. Applications ranked in the top charts 
receive a significantly greater level of attention, which is correlated with app downloads, 
purchase, and usage.  
2.3.2 Data sources 
We hand-collected data from the market-leader App Annie Store Stats, which tracks app 
market data; such as, ranking history, app metadata including descriptions, historical 
updates, app reviews, and app developer information. We supplemented and cross-
checked these data with other archival sources, including the Apple app store itself, other 
mobile app analytic sites, such as Sensor Tower, news clippings, blogs, and industry 
reports. We also conducted dozen semi-structured interviews, each running 30 to 90 





better understand the industry context and nature of competition, and to further validate 
the data. 
 This paper focuses on a single category within the U.S. app store, the health and 
fitness category, in order to mitigate concerns over possible confounding effects of 
combining different categories. At the same time, we took care in choosing a category 
that could exhibit some of the key traits that characterize most categories. Health and 
fitness is an important category in the iOS complementor market, and we chose it for 
several reasons: (a) It is ranked ninth in size out of the 25 categories listed in the Apple 
app store16; (b) It is growing 87 percent faster than the overall app market;17 which makes 
it a very competitive space; (c) Unlike a few other app categories that are dominated by 
one or a few players, the health and fitness category is fairly fragmented, which provides 
a good context to explore the competitive dynamics of complementor markets; (d) The 
majority of iPhone users have downloaded at least one health and fitness app, and thus it 
is a category that caters to a broad audience of customers18. We therefore consider that 
the health and fitness category is quite representative of the dynamics in the overall 
mobile platform complementor market. 
 We focus on apps launched from January 2013 to December 2013, checking if 
they made it to the top 300 apps in health and fitness. We continued to gather ranking 
data for these apps even if they fell outside of the top 300. In order to have a set of 










features at risk of being imitated and track how many of those features were imitated by 
each new app launched during 2013, our first step was to scan, through a meticulous and 
iterative manual inspection, the health and fitness apps in the app store as of December 
2012. We only considered the top 150 apps for this scan, under the assumption that any 
important feature would be present in at least one of these top-ranked applications. We 
checked the resulting list of features with the industry informants, to check for omissions 
or mistakes. We also asked the industry informants about the length of time we should 
consider in order to observe performance changes, and most agreed that a few months 
would be enough. Therefore, we conclude that a 12-month panel data is a long enough 
period to observe performance effects in the mobile app complementor markets. Such 
timeframe is consistent with that used by other published studies based on the mobile app 
context; such as, Ghose and Han (2014; four-month window); Li and Agarwal (2016; 
eight month window); and Yin, Mitra, and Zhang (2016; two month window). Moreover, 
the pace of change in our context is so fast that comparisons with more traditional 
product industries are revelatory. For instance, after almost a century of operations, total 
box office movie revenue in the U.S. in 2016 reached $11 billion. In contrast, the iOS app 
store reached $28 billion revenue in 2016, achieved less than a decade after its creation. 
Also, we focus on free apps in order to avoid the confounding effects of different pricing 
strategies and to focus more specifically on features, rather than price, as the main driver 
of app adoption. More than 90 percent of the total health and fitness apps available in the 





space. The final sample contains 226 apps, 170 app developers, and 1,606 total 
observations at the app-month level.  
2.3.3 Variables 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is product market performance, measured as 
the place that each app occupies in the Apple iOS app ranking in the U.S. health and 
fitness category at the end of each month in 2013. As noted earlier, Apple does not 
release apps download or app revenue data. The use of ranking data as a measure of 
performance is consistent with other studies in this context (Carare, 2012; Yin et al., 
2014). Smaller numbers indicate better places in the ranking; hence, for convenience of 
interpretation, we use reverse ranking.  
 Independent variables. Imitation level is measured as the total number of features 
that an app has imitated at the end of every month, defined from a list of key features we 
derived by manual inspection of the data as described above. Given that we expect an 
inverted U-shape effect of imitation level on performance, we also include a squared 
term. The variable is constructed in the following way. First, we consider the sub-
categories within the health and fitness category, following the guidelines set by Apple 
and informed by the insights collected from interviewees. For instance, we grouped all 
the apps related to running, cycling, and walking into one subcategory. We identified a 
total of nine sub-categories: running-cycling-pedometers; fitness classes and trainers; 
food and nutrition; better sleeping; mindfulness and meditation; health and fitness e-
magazines; baby and pregnancy; vital signs and medical; and others. For each of these, 





running-cycling-pedometers sub-category. This procedure allowed us to capture the 
defining feature of most applications, but each sub-category still contained a few 
“outlier” applications that tackled more specialized purposes – for instance, some running 
apps focused on gathering race results as opposed to tracking distance. We analyzed these 
specialized applications in each sub-category one by one to determine their defining 
feature. Our measure of imitation level captures the number of features that an app has 
imitated, excluding its defining feature. 
 We proceeded then to compare, for each app, the list of health and fitness 
features at risk of being imitated (as described earlier) with the features that the app 
launched with and the features that it added over our data collection period. Features that 
an app launched with were collected through a detailed inspection of the “App 
Description” field, while features added later were collected by analyzing the “What’s 
New” field. We inspected all apps in our sample. App developers have strong incentives 
to provide accurate and detailed information in these fields when they launch or update 
their applications, because they serve as important communication mechanisms with 
customers. Apple is also well known for a strict screening of apps in their platform to 
ensure app quality, which acts as an additional incentive to provide accurate information. 
This manual and iterative inspection process was a time-consuming effort that yielded a 
list of imitated features per app per month.   
 Speed of reaction to platform-wide changes. We measure the speed of reaction by 
looking at how fast developers react to a key platform-level change introduced by the 





days elapsed from the launch of Apple’s newest operating system at that time, iOS7. A 
new iOS version typically brings new capabilities or compatibility issues that developers 
must address and may exploit for advantage. App developers strive hard to update their 
applications to make them compatible and relevant to the new iOS version, by paying 
close attention to and actively monitoring the moves of competitors. During our data 
collection period, Apple released iOS7 in September 18, 2013. We therefore measure the 
time elapsed between the introduction of the new iOS and the time in which an app is 
adapted to take advantage of or to be compatible with the new operating system. This 
might raise the possibility of regressor right-censoring, since some apps could have been 
made compatible with iOS7 after our data collection finished. We use a dummy variable 
in our analysis to account for this issue.  
Endorsement from the platform owner. Every day, the Apple app store features a 
small number of apps over the rest, under headings such as “top apps,” “editor’s choice,” 
and “new apps.” We capture this construct by counting the number of days each month 
that a focal app is featured by Apple in the iOS app store under one of these special 
headings. 
Prior experience in the platform. We measure a developer’s prior experience in 
the platform as the cumulative number of apps that a focal developer has released in the 
iOS app store by the end of each month.    
Control variables. Several variables are included to rule out alternative 





industries, early entry does not necessarily lead to superior performance (Suarez and 
Lanzolla, 2007). Therefore, to control for this entry-timing effect, we include app age, 
operationalized as the number of days elapsed since the app’s introduction, and in 
logarithm form to account for skewedness. Second, to account for the effect of 
application quality on an app’s performance, we construct app quality by using review 
scores given by users to each application, a one-to-five scale where five is best. Our 
measure is then the app’s average monthly review score. Third, we use sub-category 
dummies to capture the characteristics that are specific to the apps in each of those sub-
categories. Finally, to capture any other time-variant effects, we include monthly time 
dummies in the estimation. 
2.3.4 Method  
We use a developer fixed-effects panel estimation for our analyses, clustering robust 
standard errors at the developer level to account for correlation among products produced 
by the same developer. This presumes that developer-specific capabilities do not change 
over time. Our model thus cannot control for unobserved heterogeneities that change over 
time. Yet, this should not be a critical drawback in our setting because while 12 months is 
a long-enough time frame to capture the performance effects at the app level, it is 
unlikely that a developer’s capabilities will experience a drastic change during such 
period. We treat our dependent variable as continuous in order to capture differences in 
the ranking position of the different applications. This is reasonable, since the ranking 





2.4 RESULTS  
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the key variables. 
Table 2.2 presents the analysis for the relationship between imitation level and 
complementors’ product market performance. The column labeled Model 1 presents a 
baseline model that only includes the controls. Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1 by adding the 
variables of imitation level and its squared term. The coefficient estimates of both of 
these variables are statistically significant, suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with product market performance. If all other things are held constant, at low levels of 
imitation, imitating one additional feature leads an app, on average, to move ahead in the 
ranking by 34 places. However, the direction of the effect reverses when a developer 
imitates nine or more key features, as Figure 2.2 shows. The inflection point for the U-
shaped curve falls within the data range of our specific setting (Haans et al., 2016)19. 
These results lend support to our Hypothesis 1. 
 Model 3 in Table 2.2 tests Hypothesis 3a by adding an interaction term between 
the level of imitation and the level of endorsement that a complementor receives from the 
platform owner. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term is positive and 
significant, suggesting that endorsement from the platform owner, as expected, positively 
moderates the effect of imitation level on performance. In particular, our results indicate 
that for every additional day that an app is featured by the platform owner as a “top apps” 
or “editor’s choice” or “new apps”, the performance gain for the app is an additional half 
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inverted U-shaped curve. The test confirmed the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship 





place in the app ranking. Model 4 tests Hypothesis 4a by adding an interaction term 
between imitation level and a developer’s prior experience in the platform. The 
coefficient sign is positive and statistically significant, and the size of the coefficient 
suggests that each additional app that adds to the previous experience of a developer in a 
focal platform boosts the performance effect of each imitated feature by about one place 
in the ranking. Model 5 in Table 2.2 is a full model; our results remain largely consistent. 
 Table 2.3 presents the analysis for the relationship between reaction time to 
changes introduced by the platform owner and complementor’s product market 
performance – we follow a similar procedure as for the previous analysis. In Model 2, the 
coefficient estimate for the speed of reaction to changes introduced by the platform 
owner is negative and significant, lending support to Hypothesis 2. All other things being 
equal, on average, a 10 percent decrease in the speed of reaction to the changes 
introduced by the platform owner is associated with a drop of nine places in the ranking. 
In Model 3, we add the moderator variable of endorsement from the platform owner in 
order to test Hypothesis 3b. The coefficient estimate of the variable is negative and 
significant, suggesting a positive moderating effect of platform owner endorsement on 
the relationship between reaction time and performance. On average, one additional 
endorsement from the platform owner further boosts the effect of timely reaction to 
changes introduced by the platform owner by about a half place in the ranking. 
Hypothesis 4b, regarding the moderating effect of prior experience in the platform, tested 






2.4.1 Additional analysis and robustness checks 
To assess the reliability of our findings, we ran several robustness analyses. First, in order 
to rule out alternative explanations for our findings, we included two variables that prior 
scholars in the strategy and innovation literature have identified as affecting performance. 
Complementors that innovate regularly can become “moving targets” for their 
competitors, and thus would tend to be more successful. We test for this alternative 
explanation and present the results in the Appendix A – Table A1, Model 1 and Model 2. 
As done in prior work in similar settings (Boudreau, 2012; Foerderer et al., 2016), we 
control for innovation by counting the number of major updates to each application over 
time. Our results remain consistent for the analyses of both imitation level and reaction 
time. Alternatively, we capture the innovation construct by including a variable that 
counts the number of new applications that a focal developer releases every month (refer 
to Appendix A –Table A1 in Model 3 and Model 4). Once again, our basic results and 
support for the main hypotheses remain unaltered.  
 Second, we use an alternative dependent variable. Instead of measuring market 
performance by the position in a ranking derived by the number of downloads, we use a 
revenue-based ranking variable, as both rankings (based on downloads or revenues) were 
available20. As shown in the Appendix A, Table A2, the results remain consistent: the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between level of imitation and performance, and the 
positive relationship between the speed of reaction to changes by the platform owner and 
performance, both hold. All the other things being equal, on average, imitating one 
                                                          





additional feature leads an app to move ahead in revenue-based ranking by 32 places. 
Also, a 10 percent decrease in the speed of reaction to a change by the platform owner, 
makes an app fall behind in such ranking by around nine places on average, all other 
things being equal. 
 A final robustness check has to do with the fact that the number of features that an 
app imitates could be related to the size and complexity of the focal application. Larger, 
more complex apps may be expected to imitate more features than smaller, less complex 
ones. For our analysis, we operationalize this construct as the size of the app (in MB). 
The main results hold.    
 
2.5 DISCUSSION  
Despite the importance of complementors on platform markets, there is a dearth of 
scholarly work that focuses on the competitive dynamics experienced by platform 
complementors, as opposed to research that focuses on platform owners. Platform 
markets are often orchestrated and controlled by a single firm, which makes them 
different from traditional product markets and has an effect on the type of strategies that 
platform participants follow. In addition, platform complementor markets feature low 
entry barriers and are characterized by extremely high rates of entry. In such settings, the 
association between performance and innovation (Christensen 1997; Schumpeter 1942), 
price (Porter, 1980), or timing of entry (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) is weakened, 
and different strategies seem to be required than are used in non-platform markets. We 





and the speed of reaction to changes introduced by the platform owner – which have 
received scant attention in prior literature. We theorize on and empirically test these 
strategies in the context of a large and well-known platform market: software applications 
for Apple smartphones, represented by the Apple iOS app store.  
 Our focus on the role of imitation and our findings that the level of imitation is 
associated with performance in the market we study, together with the fact that this 
relationship follows an inverted U-shape, have important implications for theory 
development. The structural characteristics of digital platform complementor markets 
provide a fertile ground for imitation to have a heightened role. This study enhances our 
understanding of the role of imitation beyond the traditional focus of imitation as a 
deterrence mechanism, thereby adding to an emerging set of papers that look at the role 
of imitation on performance (Giachetti et al., 2017; Lee and Zhu, 2012; Ross and 
Sharapov, 2014). Unlike these other recent papers, we consider imitation in the context of 
digital platform complementor markets. We conceptualize imitation as a continuum and 
use the level of imitation as one of our explanatory variables, in contrast with the 
traditional treatment that tends to consider a binary state: imitator or innovator. By 
conceptualizing imitation at this more granular level, we can explore how different levels 
of imitation are associated with product performance. In the context we study, we find, 
for instance, that performance increases with imitation up to the point where nine key 
features have been imitated, but that additional imitation is detrimental to performance. 
We also theorize about the mechanisms that are behind these results.  





because imitation can influence how markets evolve. For instance, imitation may result in 
a source of variation, not just a promoter of homogeneity. Our argument here is in line 
with what some neo-institutional theorists have proposed (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). 
High levels of imitation in a fast-moving industry with extremely high levels of entry can 
accelerate the formation of product categories. As imitation continues, these newly 
formed categories are increasingly better defined and draw finer-grained boundaries 
(Grodal et al., 2015; Navis and Glynn, 2010). For instance, in the 2017 iOS app store, the 
“Magazines and Newspapers” category is broken down in more than 20 subcategories. 
Five years earlier, in 2012, the category (labeled “Newsstand” back then) appeared in the 
app store with zero subcategories. Over time, apps that presented differentiating features 
in the category, e.g. a focus on business issues, were imitated by others that followed. As 
this imitation process continued, the “Magazines and Newspapers” category branched out 
in sub-categories, allowing for the grouping together of apps that shared similar features 
(Bowker and Star, 2000). For instance, “Business and Investing” became a distinct 
subcategory from “Brides and Weddings.” In other words, imitation in the space led to a 
sharpening of the distinctions between different types of products, hence lowering 
homogeneity at the category level by allowing the emergence of distinct subcategories.  
 We focus on the relationship between the speed of reaction to the changes 
introduced by the platform owner and its relationship to performance. Unlike traditional 
product markets, platform complementors need to be vigilant of the platform owners’ 
actions, since owners set the “rules of the game.” We hypothesize and find strong support 





owner and the performance of platform complementor products. For a complementor, the 
decision of whether or not to react quickly to changes introduced by the platform owner 
is not a trivial one. These changes can represent new opportunities to be exploited (for 
instance, they can allow for a major new feature to be introduced in a complementor’s 
product), but they can also create challenges for the complementor. For example, a 
complementor may find the new features allowed by the change attractive, but realize 
that taking advantage of those features would require substantial changes in its product. 
Often, it is not simple to predict if customers would value or even want the changes, so 
the investment in adapting to the platform changes can carry significant uncertainty. 
Delaying that investment is also risky, however, because it can leave a complementor’s 
product falling behind those of competitors that are quicker to react to the owner-induced 
changes. Worse still, it can leave the complementor’s product with backward 
compatibility problems (Kretschmer and Claussen, 2016). 
 This paper is part of an emerging concern to better understand the perspective of 
complementors in digital platform markets (e.g. Cennamo et al., 2018), and is to our 
knowledge the first to explore the role of imitation and the reaction to owner-induced 
changes in the platform on complementor’s product performance. Interestingly, the 
markets created by platforms have been compared to regulated markets, with platform 
owners acting as the regulators (Farrell and Katz, 2000), because their influence “extends 
to rule-making and regulating the conduct of firms beyond their economic boundaries” 
(Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). Such regulated environment, although it provides a level 





complementors can introduce: the platform owner has given complementors a defined 
space and strict rules they must adhere to when designing new products. Although 
platform-specific differences may exist due to different degrees of control exercised by 
platform owners (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013), the presence of this built-in ceiling 
on innovation may help explain our findings regarding the importance of imitation and 
responding to changes brought by the platform owner.  
 In addition to the direct effects discussed above, we also explore contingent 
factors that could change the direction or magnitude of their effects on performance. We 
specifically examine the endorsement from the platform owner (given the influence and 
prestige that platform owners enjoy), and the role that prior experience in a focal platform 
have on product performance (given the important platform-specific investment in skills 
that complementors have to make). Our approach to account for contingencies is in line 
with an emerging stream of studies that argue that imitation is not context-independent 
(e.g., Csaszar and Siggelkow, 2010; Lee and Zhou, 2012; Ross and Sharapov, 2014). 
Unlike prior studies that examine agency-driven characteristics (e.g. imitator’s 
capabilities, market positioning, organizational structure, complexity of an imitatee’s 
business practices, etc.), we examine another important dimension unique to platform 
markets – the relational aspect between the owner and complementors – exploiting the 
fact that complementors and owners are tightly coupled (Ceccagnoli et al., 2014). This 
contingent approach to account for platform-specific dynamics is well suited to the 
peculiar structure and unique nature of platform complementor markets.  





be at nine key product features; imitating more than nine features is associated with lower 
performance in our sample. While this is an interesting and useful finding in and of itself, 
future research can add precision to the imitation-performance relationship by exploring 
this relationship in different settings. The notion of an inflection point in the strategic use 
of imitation opens an interesting and relatively unexplored angle to look at the 
competitive dynamics in contested markets. Surely, the location of this inflection point 
will vary depending on contingent factors internal and external to a given actor. Our 
research studies two sets of contingencies that are important in the specific setting we 
consider. There is a need for future research to further unpack other contingent factors 
that may play a role, including those at the macro level, such as markets or institutional 
factors.  
 Our findings also have implications for practitioners, particularly entrepreneurs in 
markets with high levels of entry and exit. Practitioner outlets tend to over-emphasize the 
role of innovators, while demoting the role of imitation – imitators are often labeled 
“copycats.” Our study shows that imitation can indeed be associated with performance, 
and that there are ways to be a “smart” imitator by understanding that at some level, 
additional imitation efforts do not pay off. For the particular case of platform markets, 
our study highlights the importance of reacting timely to changes introduced by the 
platform owner. On a broader level, our paper shows that, far from being negative or 
reactive traits of competitive strategy, imitation and speed of reaction to changes in the 



























































Table 2.1: Summary statistics  
 
  
N Mean SD Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Product market performance 1,471 552.296 324.005 1 1001 1
2 Imitation level 1,606 4.916 3.385 0 17  0.279* 1
3 Ln (speed of reaction to the change by the platform owner) 1,606 3.777 1.497 0 4.663  -0.069*  -0.350* 1
4 Endorsement from the platform owner 1,437 17.540 40.785 0 333  0.091*  -0.105* 0.038 1
5 Prior experience in the platform 1,606 26.266 103.291 0 1197 0.019 0.028 0.035 0.034 1
6 Ln (app age) 1,606 4.461 1.081 0 5.899 -0.144* 0.167* -0.061* 0.017 0.029 1
7 App quality 1,606 2.651 2.055 0 5  0.421* 0.409* -0.259* -0.161*  0.050* -0.041








Table 2.2: Regression results for imitation level  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln (app age) -43.239** -47.986**  -46.527*** -44.421** -42.669***
(19.188) (18.766) (16.496) (18.400) (16.231)
App quality 27.688***  26.087*** 24.666*** 25.544***  24.376***
(5.014) (4.874) (5.095) (4.932) (5.196)
Imitation level 70.485*** 62.780*** 55.092** 46.686**
(22.725) (20.565) (22.741) (20.961)
Imitation level
2
-3.546** -3.418** -3.000** -2.875*
(1.555) (1.478) (1.498) (1.371)
Endorsement from the platform owner -1.526 -1.647
(1.046) (1.001)
Imitation level * endorsement from the platform owner 0.396*** 0.418***
(0.125) (0.122)
Prior experience in the platform -0.277 -0.136
(1.195) (1.701)
Imitation level * prior experience in the platform 0.241*** 0.257*
(0.075) (0.148)
Constant 935.516*** 694.979*** 673.294*** 711.332*** 682.094***
(107.048) (101.275) (101.202) (111.588) (109.849)
Developer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subcategory FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,471 1,471 1,304 1,471 1,304
R-squared 0.593 0.599 0.622 0.601 0.624
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the developer level are in paratheses
          *** at the 0.01 level of signifiance, ** at the 0.05 level of signifiance, * at the 0.1 level of signifiance







Table 2.3: Regression results for speed of reaction to platform-owner induced changes 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln (app age) -43.239** -47.690*** -46.017*** -47.055** -45.119***
(19.188) (18.128) (16.003) (18.155) (16.096)
App quality 27.688*** 26.462*** 25.032*** 26.400*** 24.946***
(5.014) (4.978) (5.230) (5.023) (5.254)
Ln (speed of reaction to the change by the platform owner) -85.453*** -73.040*** -74.365*** -61.956***
(16.500) (15.597) (23.795) (21.668)
Endorsement from the platform owner 3.122***  3.172***
(1.075) (1.076)
Ln (speed of reaction to the change by the platform owner) * endorsement from the platform owner -0.737** -0.762**
(0.358) (0.353)
Prior experience in the platform 1.065 1.179
(1.055) (0.958)
Ln (speed of reaction to the change by the platform owner) * prior experience in the platform  -0.119 -0.086
(0.100) (0.211)
Dummy for right-censoring -33.377 -40.070 -23.083 -30.756
(43.081) (41.165) (49.802) (46.944)
Constant 935.516*** 1301.353*** 1180.52***  1236.087*** 1106.976***
(107.048) (136.397) (129.683) (161.926) (146.644)
Developer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subcategory FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,471 1,471 1,304 1,471 1,304
R-squared 0.593 0.596 0.616 0.597 0.616
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the developer level are in paratheses
          *** at the 0.01 level of signifiance, ** at the 0.05 level of signifiance, * at the 0.1 level of signifiance





INTRA-PLATFORM ENVELOPMENT: THE COOPETITIVE DYNAMICS 
BETWEEN PLATFORM OWNERS AND PLATFORM COMPLEMENTORS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Digital platforms, such as Apple iOS, Google Android, Amazon.com, and Etsy.com, have 
become an important enabler of the birth and growth of entrepreneurial firms that provide 
complementary products to each platform. Despite this fact, most prior studies have 
focused on how platform owners grow and compete against other platforms (Cennamo 
and Santalo, 2013; Eisenmann et al., 2011; Gawer and Cusumano. 2002; Iansiti and 
Levien, 2004; Seamans and Zhu, 2017) and particularly on the most well-known 
competitive battles between two platform owners, such as Amazon versus Microsoft in 
cloud computing or Apple versus Google in smartphone systems (Eisenmann et al., 2011; 
Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Suarez and Kirtley, 2012; Zhu and 
Iansiti, 2012). When it comes to complementors, this research from a platform owner’s 
perspective has largely assumed a synergetic and cooperative relationship between a 
platform owner and its complementors. This assumption comes from the fact that, for a 
platform owner, it is critical to ensure a thriving community of complementors that can 
create strong indirect network effects to attract users (Clements and Ohashi, 2005; Katz 
and Shapiro, 1994; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). In turn, a platform is 
attractive to complementors because it offers a large and growing market, and because 
platform owners make available a diverse set of tools at low cost or no charge to 




(APIs), and software development kits (SDKs) that help complementors to produce for a 
platform (Basole and Karla, 2012; Boudreau 2012; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003). These 
tools and supporting assets also level the playing field, allowing many different types of 
players to enter the platform, particularly small entrepreneurs who otherwise would have 
struggled with the liabilities of smallness and newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
 The relationship between a platform owner and its complementors, however, can 
also be competitive. A platform owner can and often does exercise different levels of 
control and regulatory power over platform complementors (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009), 
which can come with significant tension and cost for the complementors (Baldwin and 
Woodard, 2009; Gawer and Henderson, 2007). These actions range from establishing 
new policies that can suddenly change the “rules of the game” in the platform to directly 
entering the platform complementor space through launching a product that openly 
competes with one or more of the complementors’ products. This latter action represents 
the most drastic departure from the conventional assumption of a cooperative relationship 
and is the focus of the present paper. We term this action intra-platform envelopment, 
extending the notion of platform (to platform) envelopment introduced in prior literature. 
Platform envelopment has been defined as occurring “when one platform effectively 
absorbs the functions – and the user base – of an adjacent platform” (Parker et al., 2016, 
p. 222). We argue that the concept also applies to intra-platform dynamics and define 
intra-platform envelopment as the action by which the owner launches a product whose 
functionality overlaps partially or fully with the functionalities offered by one or more of 




differentiating the intra-platform envelopment concept from related concepts, such as 
vertical integration and platform-to-platform envelopment. 
 The competitive dynamics between a platform owner and its complementors have 
not been extensively studied so far (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). Only a few recent 
papers (e.g., Li and Agarwal, 2016; Zhu and Liu, 2016) are trying to fill this gap. The 
present study takes the perspective of complementors and adds to this recent stream of 
research in two ways. First, we move away from the traditional treatment of the platform 
owner’s entry into complementor markets as a dichotomous variable: enter/not enter. 
Such treatment overlooks the complexities and subtleties of the coopetitive dynamics 
inherent in the process of intra-platform envelopment. As noted, platform owners depend 
upon a vibrant community of complementors, and therefore, they have to be strategic in 
crafting their envelopment moves within the platform. By conceptualizing and collecting 
data at the product feature level, we argue – and observe – that platform owners are more 
likely to partially envelop complementors (i.e., to incorporate some but not all features in 
existing complementor products), rather than “effectively absorb” the functions and user 
base of the target. They do so to take advantage of the opportunity presented by 
enveloping, while limiting the negative impact on the entire community of 
complementors. Second, our analysis takes into account how idiosyncratic platform 
characteristics – specifically, the degree of platform central control and openness – affect 
the way that owners carry out intra-platform envelopment. Owners’ relationship with 
complementors and platform rules vary significantly across platforms, which may result 




differences can thus have a major effect on the performance of complementor products 
that experience the effect of intra-platform envelopment. 
 We conduct an empirical study on the health and fitness (H&F) complementors in 
two leading mobile platforms: Apple iOS and Google Android. This context offers an 
ideal setting to explore the relationship between a platform owner and its complementors. 
First, the H&F category in mobile platforms is fairly fragmented, with no single player or 
few players dominating the market, resulting in a vibrant platform complementor 
dynamics. Second, the category is growing fast in light of a burgeoning attention to how 
mobile apps might improve H&F. Third, the category experienced instances of intra-
platform envelopment recently in both platforms with the almost simultaneous release of 
Apple Health and Google Fit, similar software applications whose features competed 
with some applications already existing in their respective platforms. Fourth, despite the 
fact that these two platforms exercised intra-platform envelopment, they followed 
different implementation approaches in doing so. This allows us to investigate the role 
that platform-specific attributes may have on intra-platform envelopment. 
 We use a unique dataset constructed from multiple sources and run a panel data 
estimation employing a difference-in-differences approach. We find that with the pooled 
data, intra-platform envelopment correlates with an overall negative effect on the product 
performance of the affected complementors – as it could be expected. However, our 
analysis of the effect of platform-specific characteristics reveals an interesting paradox in 
the data. While intra-platform envelopment by Apple is associated with negative 




envelopment by Google, in contrast, is associated with positive performance for 
complementor products affected by Google Fit. As discussed below, we argue that this is 
the result of platform-specific characteristics, such as different levels of platform central 
control and openness that result in markedly different effects on the complementors. We 
also find that the effect of intra-platform envelopment further varies by attributes of the 
complementor and complementor products. 
 The present study contributes to three existing bodies of literature. First, it 
enhances our understanding of the platform literature by building upon an emerging 
stream of research that explores within-platform dynamics from the platform 
complementors’ perspective (e.g., Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Rietveld and Eggers, 
2017). Our work adds specificity to the notion of intra-platform envelopment by carefully 
conceptualizing it and empirically testing this phenomenon at the product feature level. 
Software applications today can be considered a bundle of many features, and platform 
owners can act strategically regarding which and how many of those features to 
incorporate when they launch products that overlap with those of complementors. We 
also show that the degree of competitive pressure that complementors experience when 
the owner engages in intra-platform envelopment significantly varies depending on 
platform-specific characteristics. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first 
attempt to theorize and empirically examine – with a large dataset – the relationship 
between the heterogeneity in platform-specific characteristics, owner-complementor 
dynamics, and the performance of complementor products. 




enabled by the emergence of digital platforms (Isenberg, 2010; Nambisan and Baron, 
2013). While digital platforms and their associated complementor markets have become a 
fertile ground for entrepreneurs by helping them overcome the liabilities of newness and 
smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965), this study shows that possible competition with the 
platform owner is a possibility that complementors need to factor in. Our study also 
shows that the effect of intra-platform envelopment can vary significantly, depending on 
the platform in which a complementor competes, and on some characteristics of 
complementors and their products. In addition to the differences in how the Apple iOS 
and Google Android platforms approach intra-platform envelopment, our study points to 
possible strategies that entrepreneurs can use to improve their performance in such 
situations. We find that the effect of intra-platform envelopment differs by a 
complementor’s product pricing, product designing strategy and prior experience in a 
focal platform. 
 Third, this study contributes to the coopetition literature (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996). Extant empirical research on coopetition has focused on cooperation 
among competitors, namely situations in which two or more competitors decide at some 
point to collaborate (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Gnyawali et al., 2006; Gnyawali and 
Park, 2011; Harbison and Pekar, 1998). In other words, the directionality of coopetition 
in existing empirical studies largely goes from competition to collaboration. In contrast, 
the intra-platform envelopment phenomenon we explore in this paper features a reverse 
directionality; the players (platform owner and complementors) are first engaged in a 




decides to enter the complementor market. What makes coopetition in this setting further 
different from prior research on the topic is the fact that, by definition, the platform 
owner has an asymmetric advantage over its complementors, given the control it exerts 
on the platform’s technology, rules, and regulations. Another difference between 
coopetition in digital platforms and prior coopetition work is the fact that in extant 
research, the set of potential partners for coopetition tends to be known in advance and 
often involves a few or a finite set of players. In contrast, in digital platforms, hundreds 
of new complementors can enter the market each month, and some can grow very fast, 
creating a very different competitive dynamic from those observed in prior work.  
 
3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Coopetition is defined as simultaneous cooperation and competition between players 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). The relationship between a platform owner and its 
complementors in digital platforms exhibits characteristics of coopetition. On the one 
hand, these players are in a situation of symbiotic interdependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). For a platform owner, a large and diverse number of platform complementors is 
critical to outcompete rival platforms, because complementors create indirect network 
effects for the platform which can increase users’ utility (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rochet 
and Tirole, 2003). In turn, platform complementors depend on the platform for access to 
a large and growing market. Owners also provide a range of tools and support, such as 
technical documentation, APIs, and SDKs, to facilitate complementors’ product 




complementors (Basole and Karla, 2012; Boudreau, 2012; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; 
Yoo et al., 2012). 
 On the other hand, there can also exist a competitive tension between the platform 
owner and its complementors (Chen et al., 2007). A platform owner controls the 
platform’s underling technology and can change the rules of engagement for 
complementors at any time (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Claussen et al., 2013). The 
owner’s power over complementors has been compared to “bouncer’s rights” 
(Strahilovetz, 2006). Further, platform owners can directly compete with complementors 
by launching products in the complementors’ space. Platform owners might do this for 
various reasons, including to appropriate value in attractive, fast-growing complementor 
product categories (Zhu and Liu, 2016), or to exercise a tighter control of certain strategic 
markets to avoid hold-up risks or opportunism threats coming from complementors that 
can become large and influential (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). However, given the 
emergent stage of the literature on this phenomenon, it remains unclear how the scope 
and manner in which platform owners enter complementor spaces is related to 
complementor performance. 
 To summarize, the coopetitive nature and dynamics of the owner-complementor 
relationship are more complex and nuanced than what is implied by the existing 
literature. This gap is the focus of the present paper.  
3.2.1 Conceptualizing intra-platform envelopment 
One of the most aggressive and effective entry strategies of platform owners in platform-




Kirtley, 2012), defined as occurring “when one platform effectively absorbs the functions 
– and the user base – of an adjacent platform” (Parker et al., 2016, p. 222). For instance, 
LinkedIn added the functionality of a full employment website to compete with 
Monster.com. 
 We extend the notion of platform envelopment to “within-platform” situations in 
which the platform owner releases a product whose functionality overlaps with that of 
products already offered by its complementors. Given that this action happens within the 
platform, we define it as intra-platform envelopment. The functionality overlap resulting 
from intra-platform envelopment can occur in different degrees, from the owner 
incorporating all the features of the complementors’ product to doing it only partially. 
Prior research has tended to assume platform envelopment simply as monolithic: the 
party that envelops enters the market space of the target by fully bundling its 
functionality. Our approach to intra-platform envelopment extends existing 
understandings by providing a more nuanced and granular conceptualization (and 
empirical analysis) of the phenomenon that allows for different degrees of intra-platform 
envelopment; we do so by focusing on product features as a core level of analysis. 
 Considering the level of interdependence between the platform owner and 
complementors (Venkatraman and Lee, 2004), we expect owners to proceed cautiously 
when enveloping their complementors. A key difference between platform-to-platform 
envelopment and intra-platform envelopment is the fact that, in the latter, the ultimate 
fate and performance of the party that envelops and the target party are intertwined 




envelop rival platform Foursquare and even destroy the target completely without having 
regrets or facing negative consequences. In contrast, a platform owner that wants to 
envelop its complementors needs to be more careful. Frontal attacks could ultimately 
discourage not only the affected complementors, but also other complementors that 
observe the owner’s behavior, which can result in lowering the commitment of the entire 
complementor community to the platform (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). To avoid 
discouraging complementors, owners may carry out intra-platform envelopment 
overlapping only some of the features of existing complementor products, or may launch 
products that, while competing with complementors’ products to some degree, also allow 
complementors some degree of integration with the new product to access new features. 
 Intra-platform envelopment is a different concept from vertical integration. 
Vertical integration refers to “the extent to which goods and services that can be 
purchased from outsiders [suppliers] are produced in house” (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1989). Intra-platform envelopment, in contrast, relates to actions towards complementors, 
not suppliers. Suppliers and complementors are different sets of actors that play different 
roles in platform markets, and have different relational dynamics with the platform 
owner. First, platform complementors can often be a revenue source for a given platform 
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2009), as they pay various kinds of usage fees for the 
access and resources that the platform provides. Their role is not just limited to supplying 
goods or services to a focal platform, as in the case of suppliers. Second, complementors 
control the final product that the platform customer experiences (e.g., their app, in the 




independently from their decision to join the platform. In contrast, suppliers only produce 
inputs that customers of the downstream firm do not buy as stand-alone products, but as 
part of the product that the downstream firm offers. Indeed, the different roles played by 
complementors in an industry has resulted in them being often represented as a “sixth 
force” in competitive analysis – with suppliers being a different force (Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff, 1995; Grove 1996).   
3.2.2 Intra-platform envelopment and complementor performance 
Prior research has shown that envelopment largely results in value appropriation by the 
party that envelops, away from the target party (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Such practice 
has often been used as a way for a more powerful platform to displace a weaker one 
(McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). Many cases discussed in the literature support this 
point: Microsoft bundled its Window Media Player into its operating system to challenge 
RealNetworks as the dominant streaming media platform, and also bundled its web 
browser Explorer to attack Netscape’s browsing platform. Likewise, Facebook added 
“Facebook updates” to their platform, real-time updates to their news feed, to compete 
with Twitter, and then added “Facebook places,” the ability for users to check in when in 
different locations, to compete with Foursquare. The competitive nature of platform-to-
platform envelopment has been labelled “dethroning” and “swallowing” a target, and 
aims at making the target “virtually irrelevant” (Eisenmann et al., 2006, 2011; McIntyre 
and Srinivasan, 2017; Suarez and Kirtley, 2012).  
 Recent research has shown that platform owners, when entering their 




value these players generate. For instance, Zhu and Liu (2016) found that Amazon 
entered the complementor space by competing directly in several categories – Toys & 
Games, Sports & Outdoors, Electronics, and Home & Kitchen – choosing those products 
that were in high consumer demand and were more highly rated by users. Further, the 
platform owner has a large margin to exert power, because it sets the “rules of the game” 
in the platform (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009) and oversees the direction and evolution of 
the platform’s technology. Because of this, platform owners have a built-in asymmetric 
advantage over complementors in designing and launching products that compete with 
complementor products. Moreover, in most platforms the complementor market is very 
fragmented, thus leaving any single complementor with little bargaining power or room 
for maneuvering when responding to intra-platform envelopment. 
 Therefore, with respect to the overall performance of complementor products that 
are affected by intra-platform envelopment, we hypothesize,  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Intra-platform envelopment will be negatively associated with 
the product performance of the affected complementors.  
3.2.3 The role of platform-specific characteristics  
While we expect that platform envelopment actions will tend to have, on average, a 
negative effect on complementors as captured by Hypothesis 1, platform owners may 
differ substantially in the way they envelop their complementors. More generally, 
platform owners can differ markedly in the type of policies regarding complementors and 
other platform participants. For instance, platform owners can exercise different levels of 




aggressive they are in pushing their own product to end users. Taking mobile platforms 
as an example, an aggressive owner strategy can automatically bundle the owner’s new 
product in the following update or release of the platform’s operating system, de-facto 
forcing users to have the owner’s product. Conversely, a platform owner may release its 
product leaving it up to end users if they want to have it – in our example, users of that 
platform would have to search for and download the owner’s product, as they do with all 
third-party apps. 
 Another way in which platform owners may differ when implementing intra-
platform envelopment is the extent to which they allow their complementors to access 
and integrate with the new product. In one extreme, owners might restrict complementors 
from integrating with their new product, keeping tight control of it. By keeping a tight 
control over their new product, owners underline their competitive stance towards the 
complementors in that space. In another extreme, owners can give platform 
complementors much discretion and latitude regarding how to integrate with the owner’s 
new product, allowing complementors to leverage any advantageous benefits accrued 
from the owner’s new development (Davis et al., 2002). For instance, in the context of 
mobile platforms, these different strategies can be observed in how strict or lenient APIs 
are that complementors need to use to integrate with the owner’s product. 
 Owners can also differ in their general approach to platform openness and control. 
The degree of platform openness is known to directly affect the engagement, 
participation, and dynamics of platform complementors (Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann et 




conceptualized as a spectrum (West, 2003). Platforms that follow a more “closed” 
approach usually put a higher value on coherence and control than on heterogeneity and 
diversity (Boudreau, 2010). Generally speaking, platforms with a closed approach place 
more emphasis on control by imposing rules and restrictions, restraining platform 
complementors from adjusting, tweaking, and customizing platform resources. Such 
restrictive policies reduce complementors’ ability to appropriate value. Conversely, 
platforms that pursue a more “open” approach tend to give complementors a greater deal 
of latitude to customize, integrate, and modify their products, and to accept or ignore 
platform-driven changes based on their interests and preferences. In this case, 
complementors have additional room for maneuvering to respond to the owner’s new 
product in their space.  
 We therefore hypothesize,  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The effect on the product performance of complementors 
affected by intra-platform envelopment will vary by platform. 
 
3.3 DATA AND METHOD 
3.3.1 Empirical setting: health and fitness applications  
We examine intra-platform envelopment in two leading mobile platforms, Apple iOS and 
Google Android. Apple and Google launched their app stores – Apple iOS and Google 
Play – in July 2008 and October 2008, respectively. These two companies dominate the 
market, fiercely competing against each other while jointly capturing more than 90 




than two million apps available in their respective stores. 
 We focus on a single category within the U.S. app stores, H&F category, to 
mitigate concerns over possible confounding effects of combining different category 
types, because each category in mobile platforms is quite distinct. The H&F category 
offers an ideal setting to explore our research questions for several reasons. First, it is an 
established category. For instance, H&F ranks ninth in size out of 25 categories across 
both stores, and has been growing faster than the overall app market in recent years. 
Second, unlike categories that are dominated by one or a few players, the H&F category 
is fairly fragmented and fiercely contested, which makes it a good setting to explore 
intra-platform competitive dynamics. Third, an interesting instance of intra-platform 
envelopment took place in H&F in both app stores, just one month apart from each other. 
Both Apple and Google launched products whose functionality overlaps with that of 
complementor products in their stores. The products were labeled Apple Health and 
Google Fit, respectively. Fourth, the specific approach that each company took to 
implement the envelopment action in their respective platforms is quite different (we 
cover the main differences in the next section). Finally, the launch of Apple Health and 
Google Fit did not affect all H&F apps equally. The H&F category can be further broken 
down into subcategories, based on their focal area of business (e.g., running apps, calorie 
count apps). Given that the arrangement of product functionality varies by subcategory, 
the effect of Apple Health and Google Fit was felt differently across subcategories. This 
heterogeneous effect enables us to use some subcategories as a control group to 




3.3.2 The release of Apple Health and Google Fit  
Apple Health and Google Fit were launched in late 2014 with functionality that 
overlapped with that of some of their third-party H&F apps. This phenomenon matches 
our conceptualization of intra-platform envelopment: both Apple Health and Google Fit 
focused on a particular functionality, the “tracking” of H&F data. This functionality was 
already offered by some of the third-party H&F apps. The new offering from Apple and 
Google could work as a stand-alone app, and therefore could be used as a substitute to 
third-party apps providing similar functionality. Users could now store, record, and keep 
track of a range of H&F data by directly connecting to Apple Health or Google Fit 
without relying on third-party apps. However, at the same time, Apple and Google 
released corresponding APIs/SDKs for their apps. Complementors could then integrate 
with these new apps to access some of the new functionalities offered by Apple Health or 
Google Fit. For instance, third-party H&F apps could directly employ the owner’s 
tracking functionality or import/export their data from/to Apple Health or Google Fit. 
Apple and Google were, therefore, simultaneously competing in the complementors’ 
space and offering complementors the opportunity to integrate with Health and Fit. 
Consistent with this, Table 3.1 shows qualitative data gathered through content analysis 
of business press releases and industry interviews that reflects the ambivalent sentiment 
that complementors had on the launch of Apple Health and Google Fit. 
 Although Apple and Google released their similar apps almost simultaneously, 
the way they went about launching them was markedly different. The differences are 




imposed over its complementors and users when it came to downloading or interacting 
with the new app. Apple and Google also differed substantially in their overall degree of 
openness in their relationship with complementors, with Apple espousing a more closed 
and top-down approach and Google a more open and bottom-up approach.  
Table 3.2 summarizes some of these key differences in central control and 
openness that we gathered with qualitative analysis. For example, Apple Health came 
pre-installed in all new iPhones and was automatically installed in existing iPhones 
(without requiring user permission) when users upgraded the iOS operating system in 
their devices. Google Fit, in contrast, was not pre-installed and required a manual 
download. Users that wanted the Google Fit app had to go to the Google Play app store, 
search for the app, and install it in their smartphones, as they would do with any third-
party app. Apple and Google both offered complementors the possibility to interact with 
Health and Fit, respectively, but the companies took a very different approach here as 
well. Google permitted third-party developers to exercise discretion in using its APIs, 
even allowing developers to customize the data structure and format to better suit their 
needs and to share these customized pieces of software with other developers within the 
platform. Apple, in contrast, adopted a restrictive and controlling approach to manage 
Apple Health and its corresponding APIs. For instance, APIs were very standardized and 
gave complementors little discretion to customize.  
3.3.3 Types of apps affected by intra-platform envelopment 
As noted earlier, the apps in the H&F category can be further broken down into 




running/walking/cycling; physical workouts/training; food/nutrition; sleep; women’s 
health; hydration; medical; body measurements; and others – see Table 3.3 for a brief 
description of each category. To identify these subcategories, we follow the 
classifications used by Apple and Google in their app stores, with further granularity 
taken from mobile analytic intelligence companies and a series of iterative discussions 
with industry experts. We then coded the data assigning each app to the corresponding 
subcategory. We checked for the accuracy of the classification by drawing a random 
sample of apps and having a research assistant replicate the task – inter-rater reliability of 
the classification was over 86 percent.  
 The impact of Apple Health and Google Fit varied by subcategory. For instance, 
both Apple Health and Google Fit offered tracking functionality for running activities in 
their initial release, thereby directly affecting running apps. In contrast, the first version 
of Health and Fit did not include a tracking functionality for activities related to women’s 
health (e.g., keeping track of fertility or ovulation cycle). Therefore, unlike running-
related apps, applications focusing on women’s health were not directly affected by the 
initial release of Apple Health and Google Fit. Exploiting this heterogeneity by 
subcategory in the extent and timing of intra-platform envelopment in each platform, our 
treated group is composed of apps whose focal subcategory was affected by the owners’ 
actions. Our control group is composed of apps whose primary subcategory was not 





3.3.4 Data sources  
Quantitative dataset. We constructed a unique dataset to explore the impact of intra-
platform envelopment. We combined hand-collected data of each app and its 
corresponding app developer (e.g., app description, updated history, price, and 
developer’s app portfolio) with proprietary data on app downloads. Apple and Google do 
not publicly disclose the sales and downloads of individual apps in their app stores, but 
they provide ranking data (e.g., top charts based on the number of app downloads). 
Consequently, most prior studies have used ranking data as a proxy for app performance 
(Carare, 2012; Yin et al., 2014) or have tried different methods to estimate the number of 
app downloads (Garg and Telang, 2013; Ghose and Han, 2014).  
 For our study, the data comes from three sources. First, we obtained data on the 
number of downloads per app from one of the leading specialized mobile analytic 
intelligence companies. We further collected app metadata manually and through web-
crawling from the app stores and other leading mobile analytic intelligence companies.  
 To construct our sample, we collected data for all apps tracked by our data source: 
the top 600 H&F apps in the Google Play app store and the top 1,500 H&F apps in the 
Apple iOS app store, for the period of July 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015. This mitigates 
the concern of selection bias on our part. From time to time, some apps are removed from 
the stores, due to lack of compatibility after system upgrades or something else; we 
exclude these cases from the analysis. Next, we considered only those apps that were 
launched before the actual release of Apple Health and Google Fit to allow for before-




sample to those apps released before July 1, 2014 in order to have sufficient pre-intra-
platform envelopment data points. Our final sample consists of 1,306 apps and 95,338 
observations at the app-week level in Google Play app store, and 3,696 apps and 236,544 
observations at the app-week level in Apple iOS app store.  
Qualitative dataset. As a supplementary analysis, we conducted more than 20 semi-
structured interviews with industry participants, industry experts, and scholars 
researching mobile platforms to understand the nature and dynamics of these markets and 
to validate our findings. Given the emergent and fast-paced nature of the mobile app 
industry, these qualitative accounts proved to be important in understanding the context 
and helped us to triangulate data points to fine-tune the analysis. 
3.3.5 Variables  
Dependent variable. We use the number of downloads as the dependent variable. Mobile 
platform markets tend to have long-tailed distributions; therefore, this variable enters the 
analysis in natural logarithm form to address skewness in the distribution.  
Independent variables. Affected group. We take advantage of the heterogeneous effect of 
intra-platform envelopment across subcategories through a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for apps whose focal subcategory was affected, and zero for those apps 
whose subcategory was not. Table 3.4 shows which subcategories within H&F were 
affected. 
 After intra-platform envelopment. To analyze the before-and-after performance 
effects of intra-platform envelopment, this dummy variable takes the value of zero for the 




  We also interacted after intra-platform envelopment with affected group.  
 To address any app-specific unobservable characteristics, we employ app-level 
fixed effects. We include weekly time dummies to account for any macro trends and 
time-trend differences. We do not include time-varying app-level and app-developer-
level control variables, because most of these can be an endogenous outcome of intra-
platform envelopment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Table 3.5 reports descriptive statistics 
for the main variables.  
3.3.6 Method  
We use a difference-in-differences approach, taking advantage of the unaffected app 
subcategories that act as a control group. We also use fixed-effects at the app level and at 
the platform-week level to control for any unobserved app-specific and platform-week-
specific differences. Below is the main specification, where i indexes apps; l indexes 
platforms; t indexes time (weeks); αi, and αl x αt are app and platform-time (weeks) fixed 
effects, respectively. The dependent variable of interest is y, which is the logarithm of 
downloads, and ɛ is the error term. The regression is estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS). To account for serial correlation of the error term, we report clustered robust 
standard errors at the app level. The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect 
of intra-platform envelopment on the product performance of the affected group. The 
variables that are constant within observations (e.g., variables of affected group and after 
intra-platform envelopment) are not included in the model, as they are absorbed by the 
fixed-effects model.  





3.4.1 Main results  
Model 1 in Table 3.6 shows the result of a regression pooling the data of Apple iOS and 
Google Android. The coefficient estimate of affected group * after intra-platform 
envelopment suggests that the envelopment effect is negative and statistically significant, 
lending support to Hypothesis 1. The apps affected by intra-platform envelopment 
experience a 17 percent decrease in downloads as compared to the apps that are not 
affected. 
 To test hypothesis 2, we split the sample and run the model separately by app 
store. First, we run it for the Apple iOS store. Model 2 in Table 3.6 shows that the 
coefficient estimate for the effect of intra-platform envelopment is negative and 
statistically significant: the apps affected by the introduction of Apple Health experience 
a 31 percent decrease in downloads as compared to the unaffected apps. Model 3 repeats 
the analysis for the case of Google Play store. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for 
the effect of intra-platform envelopment is positive and statistically significant, implying 
that the introduction of Google Fit has a positive effect on the affected apps. These apps 
experience a 35 percent increase in downloads compared to the unaffected apps. This 
stark difference in the responses to intra-platform envelopment in each app store lends 
support to Hypothesis 2. We elaborate on this finding in the discussion section.    
3.4.2 Auxiliary results: the role of complementor-specific characteristics 
The core finding that the effect of intra-platform envelopment is different for the two 




complementor-product-specific characteristics result in heterogeneous effects across 
platforms. We focus on three factors that are important for the performance of 
complementor products: product pricing, product sophistication, and complementor prior 
experience. We report the results of these analyses here but elaborate on them in the 
discussion section. 
Product pricing strategies: free vs. paid. One of the most important decisions for app 
developers in mobile platforms is how much to charge for their apps. App stores have 
thousands of apps, many of which are offered for free. Free apps account for almost 90 
percent of the total mobile app store downloads.  Pricing strategy (free or paid) may 
influence the magnitude and direction of the effect of intra-platform envelopment on an 
app’s performance. The variable paid app takes the value of one for paid apps, and zero 
otherwise. 
 As shown in Model 2, Table 3.7, there is no statistically significant difference 
between free and paid apps in the Apple iOS store. App pricing strategy does not appear 
to exert a significant influence on the negative effect of Apple’s envelopment actions.  
 In the case of Google Play, free and paid apps do show differences. The positive 
effect of the release of Google Fit is even stronger for free apps, whereas paid apps do not 
seem to be affected by Google’s intra-platform envelopment (the effect becomes 
insignificant), as seen in Model 2, Table 3.8.  
Product design strategies: basic Features vs. advanced Features. App developers’ 
revenue not only comes from charging for the product. App developers can also earn 




features in an app that make user experience richer. Hence, apps with in-app purchase 
capabilities tend to be more feature-rich than those without them. By 2017, in-app 
purchase revenue has become the number one revenue source for mobile apps, with a 
total global revenue of about $37 billion. The variable in-app purchase takes a value of 
one if the app offers in-app purchases, and zero otherwise.  
 Model 3 in Table 3.7 shows that the negative effect of the Apple Health release on 
affected apps disappears for apps that offer in-app purchases (coefficient estimate 
becomes statistically insignificant). In contrast, for apps without in-app purchases, the 
negative effect of intra-platform envelopment still remains significant.  
 Model 3 in Table 3.8 shows a similar analysis for the Google Android platform. 
As we found for the Apple platform, apps that offer in-app purchases do not seem to be 
affected by Google’s intra-platform action (coefficient estimate becomes statistically 
insignificant), while apps that do not offer in-app purchases see a stronger effect than that 
of Model 1.  
Developer experience in the platform: novice vs. seasoned. To take advantage of the 
capabilities offered by a platform, complementors need to invest to learn the platform’s 
technology and user requirements. Each platform has its own distinctive technological 
characteristics. For example, Apple iOS and Google Play require different coding skills 
and programming languages (Swift and Go, respectively). Thus, we expect that the level 
of a complementor’s prior experience in a focal platform will influence how the 
complementor product performance will change as a result of intra-platform 




the developer has greater-than-average experience developing apps in that focal platform 
(compared to all developers in the platform), and zero otherwise. 
 Model 4 in Table 3.7 shows that, for the case of the Apple app store, greater-than-
average experience in the platform makes the negative effect of intra-platform 
envelopment become insignificant, while it still remains significant for the less 
experienced developers.  
 Model 4 in Table 3.8 shows the results for Google platform. The difference 
between developers with greater-than-average experience and the rest is not statistically 
significant.  
3.4.3 Additional analyses and robustness checks 
In this section, we discuss potential identification concerns in our analysis and describe 
how our model specifications help to address them.  
Pre-trends before intra-platform envelopment. One concern is whether complementors 
were able to anticipate the intra-platform envelopment actions by Apple and Google, 
particularly regarding the direction of the expected effect and which subcategories were 
to be most affected. We do not think this was the case. Our qualitative evidence suggests 
that complementors did not anticipate the directionality of the change or the specific 
subcategories that would be affected (e.g., see quotes in Table 3.1). Our research also 
suggests that random elements might have played a role to some extent in the decision of 
the platform owners as to which subcategories to target. For example, the subcategory of 
women’s health was not part of the initial launch of Apple Health in 2014. However, it 




exclusion of the women’s health subcategory in the original release reportedly resulted 
from the fact that the majority of Apple developers were male and unconsciously omitted 
considering this subcategory for the original launch.  
In addition to the qualitative analysis above, we also check for pre-trends in our 
sample data. We estimate the following equation,  
ln (downloads)ilt = αi + αl  x αt + ∑𝛽 (affected group x weeks from/to intra-platform 
envelopmentilt) + ɛilt 
Figure 3.1a (Apple iOS) and Figure 3.1b (Google Android) plot a time-series of 
the coefficient estimate β against weeks from/to the date of the intra-platform 
envelopment instance in each platform. We set the event date of intra-platform 
envelopment as the day when Apple Health and Google Fit were officially released to the 
public: September 17, 2014 and October 28, 2014, respectively. However, Apple and 
Google both released stable beta versions to developers before the official product 
launch, which apparently had a noticeable effect on the pre-trends, as shown in Figure 
3.1. The stable beta release of Apple Health came with iOS 8 beta 5 firmware, released in 
early August 2014, about seven weeks before the actual Apple Health release. The stable 
beta version of Google Fit was also released in early August. A visual inspection of the 
time trends considering the date of release of stable beta versions suggests that 
complementors most likely did not anticipate the intra-platform actions by the owners. 
Compatibility between affected and control groups. To further mitigate concerns over 




Coarsened-Exact-Matching (CEM) analysis (Blackwell et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2012). 
We then used the matched pairs to run a difference-in-differences estimation, as a 
robustness check to make the affected apps more comparable with the controls. Our 
analysis accounts for other possible differences and biases by performing a coarsened-
exact matching of affected and control apps based on characteristics of the apps and app 
developers before the treatment. The CEM process allows us to pair unaffected apps with 
affected apps that are very similar, except for the fact that the latter ones experienced 
intra-platform envelopment. Indeed, the degree of imbalance (L1 statistic) improved from 
0.30 to 0.19, and there are no observed statistically significant differences between the 
sample elements of the two groups after the CEM process is applied (see Appendix B, 
Table B1, for details). The main regression results remain largely consistent (see 
Appendix B, Table B2, for additional information).  
Time-varying controls. We did not include time-varying controls in the main models out 
of endogeneity concerns (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). However, we did include them in 
our robustness checks, particularly those variables that could potentially affect the 
performance of complementor products such as: app quality (operationalized as the 
average app review score in a given week), app network effects (operationalized as the 
number of reviews that an app received in a given week, as proxy for its installed base) 
and app age (operationalized as time elapsed since an app was first launched). The main 





3.5 DISCUSSION  
This paper enhances our understanding of the cooperation-competition tension that exists 
between platform owners and their complementors. We focus on the relatively under-
explored consequences of intra-platform envelopment on the product performance of 
affected complementors, particularly on how these consequences vary by platform and 
the way each platform implements the envelopment action. We empirically test our 
hypotheses with a unique, large-scale dataset of H&F apps in the two major mobile 
platforms: Apple iOS and Google Android. 
 Our study contributes to the platform literature, which has largely focused on 
platform-to-platform competition (that is, competition between two platform owners; see 
Eisenmann et al., 2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Selander et al., 2013), while paying 
scant attention to intra-platform dynamics. Consequently, most of these extant studies 
have adopted a platform owner perspective. This has led scholars to highlight the 
cooperative aspect of the complementor-owner relationship: that is, owners provide 
complementors with access to a large market, while complementors provide owners with 
products that enhance the value of their platforms for end users.  However, as we have 
shown here, the relationship between these parties is more nuanced and complicated. We 
adopt a complementor-centered approach in our research and examine instances in which 
the collaborative relationship between the two parties breaks. In particular, we investigate 
the entry of a platform owner into its complementor market space by launching products 
that directly overlap with functionality offered by existing complementors – an action 




differences that platform strategies and characteristics can have on the way intra-platform 
envelopment is conducted and the effect it has on complementors. To our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to look into these differences across platforms. 
 Our analysis shows that intra-platform envelopment, contrary to what existing 
platform theory (based on platform-to-platform data) has led us to believe, can be enacted 
to different degrees. Our granular data, at the product feature level, allows us to capture 
these differences and to show, for instance, that intra-envelopment actions may only 
affect some of the functionality of the affected complementors. We argue that the 
differences between platform-to-platform and intra-platform envelopment are due to the 
different nature of the dynamics between the actors. While in platform-to-platform 
settings the dynamics are purely competitive, in intra-platform envelopment settings the 
dynamics are both competitive and collaborative (i.e., coopetitive), because a platform’s 
success also depends on having a healthy complementor ecosystem. Because of this, 
platform owners need to be careful with their intra-platform actions. Our research shows 
that they can do this in two ways. First, by doing only “partial” envelopment, targeting 
only some of the functions offered by complementors. Second, by giving complementors 
the possibility to benefit from the product they introduce in their space, through the 
ability to integrate with the product to access additional functionality or platform-wide 
data.  
 A noticeable finding in our study is the fact that a similar intra-platform action 
can have very different consequences from one platform to another. Specifically, we 




complementor space and released just one month apart, were associated with negative 
consequences for Apple complementors but positive consequences for Google’s. The 
explanation to this apparent paradox can be found in the differences in how each of these 
players implemented their intra-platform actions. 
 First, Apple and Google differed in the degree of commercial aggressiveness by 
which they promoted their intra-platform envelopment actions; this can be seen, for 
instance, in how hard they pushed their product “down the throat” of their respective 
platform participants. For instance, Apple Health came included in all new iPhones, was 
automatically installed in the next iOS update for existing customers, and could not be 
deleted. Google Fit, in contrast, did not come standard in new Android smartphones, but 
users had the option to install it if they wished: to do that, they had to access Google’s 
app store, search, and install Google Fit as they would do with any other application. 
Similarly, when it came to complementors, Apple released APIs with Apple Health that 
did not give any discretion to complementors: the format and data structure could not be 
modified or customized, and Apple Health acted as an inescapable link for 
complementors that wanted to connect to take advantage of the new functionality offered 
by the application. In contrast, Google provided data formats and structure, but allowed 
complementors to customize and extend the templates. Google also allowed 
complementor-to-complementor connectivity without major restrictions. 
 Thus, while in general we should expect the entry by platform owners into 
complementor space to have a negative effect on complementors (Hypothesis 1), our 




can be minimized or even reversed (Hypothesis 2). Under such conditions, 
complementors may benefit for several reasons. First, the mere fact that the platform 
owner decides to enter a particular product space brings more visibility to that domain 
and can result in more users attracted to the space. Second, enhanced visibility from the 
platform owner’s presence gives legitimacy to the space (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Rao, 1994), and amounts to a positive spillover effect of the sort, “a rising tide lifts all 
boats.” Third, as noted above, intra-platform envelopment can come with new platform-
wide functionalities that complementors can take advantage of to enhance their products 
and add additional value to their users. In our study these potential benefits vary 
significantly depending on the platform, which explains the “paradox” of Android’s 
complementors being better-off from Google’s intra-platform envelopment. Our results 
show that Google’s complementors benefited from the entry of the platform owner in 
their complementor space, while Apple’s complementors were negatively affected. We 
argue that Google’s complementors were more likely to capture the value of increased 
visibility, legitimacy and functionality from the owner’s entry into their space than Apple 
complementors due to Google’s more lenient and flexible approach.  
 In addition to differences across platforms, we find interesting differences within 
each platform across complementor products. While these differences across 
complementors in a platform may also be related to platform heterogeneity, we argue that 
demand-specific heterogeneity (Adner and Zemsky, 2006) is also a factor. For instance, 
Apple’s focus on integration and high-quality user experience translates into more 




products. Google, in contrast, tends to attract users who are more price-conscious and less 
inclined to spend money on apps or apps functionality (Dilger, 2016; O’Leary, 2017). 
This heterogeneity in the user bases across platforms can explain our finding that the 
negative effect of intra-platform envelopment is not significant for those products that 
have in-app purchases and for products developed by highly experienced developers in 
the Apple platform. The same logic helps explain the differences we find for Google 
applications, as the positive effect of intra-platform envelopment is mainly explained by 
free apps and those apps that do not have in-app purchases.  
 Our research can also help complementors to decide which platforms to join. Our 
results highlight the importance for them to carefully account for a platform’s governance 
model and degree of control before making their decision about joining a platform. The 
approach used by platform owners to manage their relationship with complementors may 
produce inadvertent consequences for complementors’ performance down the road 
should the owners attempt intra-platform envelopment. Because a large fraction of 
complementors in the new digital platforms are small entrepreneurs, our study contributes 
to improving our understanding on the entrepreneurial ecosystems that are enabled by 
these platforms (Isenberg, 2010; Nambisan and Baron, 2013). Our findings suggest that 
these entrepreneurs have some degree of maneuvering when it comes to the impact of 
intra-platform envelopment, because we show that the effect varies by complementor-
specific and complementor product-specific characteristics. In other words, 





 This study also contributes to our understanding on the coopetition literature. 
Empirical studies on coopetition have mainly examined situations in which competitors 
decide to collaborate (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Gnyawali et al., 2006; Gnyawali and 
Park, 2011; Harbison and Pekar, 1998). For example, smartphone competitors collaborate 
to create a richer mobile operating system by forming a joint venture, Symbian. In the 
case of intra-platform envelopment, the directionality is opposite: it starts with 
collaborators (platform owners and complementors) that suddenly become competitors 
when the owner enters the complementors’ space. Digital platforms also present unique 
challenges that have not been explored in prior studies. For instance, the unusually large 
and constantly growing number of complementors, due to low entry barriers, add to the 
complexity and dynamism of the coopetitive relationship. 
 Our study points to interesting patterns that future research can investigate in 
other platform-mediated contexts. Another interesting avenue for future study would be 
to examine how platform-specific characteristics change over time, and how those 
changes affect the owner-complementor dynamics. The differences between Apple and 
Google in terms of their governance structure and degree of central control are likely to 
change as time goes by. Future research, equipped with longer longitudinal data, can 
investigate what are the threshold levels of control and value capture that determine 









Figure 3.1: Dynamics of the treatment effect  
                  
 
   a. Apple iOS (Apple Health)     b. Google Android (Google Fit) 
 
Note.  The dots correspond to coefficient estimates from the regression models, in which the indicator variable of the affected group interacts 
with weeks from/to intra-platform envelopment. The first week in the sample in each app store was dropped from the analysis. The 
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Table 3.1: Competing perspectives on the impact of Apple Health and Google Fit on health and fitness applications  
 
Sources: Business press releases, including Apple Health’s and Google Fit’s sites, and interviews with industry experts and app developers 
 
 
Attributes  Excerpts from business press releases and interviews with industry experts and industry participants  
Direct substitute to 
existing health and 
fitness apps  
“Apple Health and Google Fit work directly with health and fitness devices”  
“Google Fit uses the sensors in the users’ activity tracker [e.g., Fitbit] or their mobile devices to record physical 
fitness activities”  
“In iOS 8.0, the Apple system can automatically save data from compatible Bluetooth LE heart rate monitors”  
“The Apple system can automatically import activity data from M7 motion coprocessor, if available” 
“Apple Health is already logging steps (if you have an iPhone 5S or newer) and flights of stairs climbed (if you 
have iPhone 6 or 6 plus)”  
“Apple Health and Google Fit can keep track of your steps without help from an external app or device” 
“Truth be told, you don’t even need a wearable or additional smart device to get moderate use from Apple 
Health/ Google Fit”  
“ Unless you have tech that goes beyond what Apple or Google can offer in a smartphone, you’ll be eaten alive”  
Enabler that 
facilitates the digital 
health ecosystem  
“Apple Healthkit allows third-party apps to focus on implementing only the aspects they are most interested in, 
leaving other tasks to more specialized apps”  
“The main aim of Apple Health is to provide a single point of reference for all of your aggregated health and 
fitness data…..and the more third-party services you can plug into it, the better…” 
“For a more complete picture, Apple Health works best when synced to another fitness tracker or smartwatch 
you are always wearing…via that device’s companion app” 
“ Having a company like Apple and Google educating everyone on why this stuff matters can help the whole 
category become mainstream faster”  
“ Thanks to Apple Healthkit, developers can spend a lot more time on building more personalized guidance and 
incorporating more types of data”  
“Apple Health and Google Fit can help reach a broader audience and forge partnerships with the traditional 
health care industry…that would be hard for start-ups to accomplish alone”  







Table 3.2: Differences in platform characteristics (degrees of central control and openness) between Apple and Google  
 
Note: This description is about the initial release of Apple Health and Google Fit (late 2014), aligned with the time frame of the quantitative analysis.  
Sources: Business press releases including Apple Health’s and Google Fit’s official sites, interviews with industry experts and industry participants, and 
literature review (Kenney and Pon 2011, Muller et al. 2011, Eaton et al. 2015) 





• Pre-installed for new iPhones. For existing 
ones, automatically installed when upgrading 
iOS 
• Cannot be removed from the phone 
LOW 
• Manual search and download from the app store 
required 





• Constrain data types/units to a pre-determined 
list; developers cannot create customized 
versions 
• Provide one type of Healthkit framework 
• Healthkit only accepts and aggregates health 
and fitness data that was collected through the 
Apple’s Health app 
LOW 
• Developers can define (and also share) custom data 
types/units 
• Provide separate sets of framework (Sensors; 
History; Recording APIs), with which developers 
can mix and match 





• Restricted to be used only between iOS systems 
and devices  
• Only compatible with Apple Watch for 
wearable devices  
HIGH 
• Support multiple platforms and devices, including 
iOS devices and web apps  








• Walled-garden strategy – emphasizing 
consistent and intuitive user experience 
• ‘Lock-down’ approach of strictly controlling 
app developers  
• Tight and selective third-party app approval 
process. Slow: it takes six days on average 
HIGH 
• Open, free licensing strategy – focusing on quickly 
capturing market share as a later comer  
• ‘Laissez-faire’ approach of exerting little control 
over app developers  
• Fewer restrictions and rejections in third-party app 












1 (Fitness) Running/walking/cycling GPS (sensor) tracking-activities related
2 (Fitness) Physical workouts/training Physical class; training; workout-enhancing activities
3 (Health) Food/nutrition Calories or macro-nutrition related; meal-plan; diet 
4 (Health) Sleep Sleep cycle; sleep inducing activities related
5 (Health) Women's health Fertility or ovulation tracking related
6 (Health) Hydration Hydration level  tracking or inducing activities related
7 (Health) Medical Vital signs (e.g., blood pressure, glucose, blood alcohol content, body temperature); medical
8 (Health) Body measurement Weights; heights; BMI; body-fat measurment related







Table 3.4: Effect of Apple Health and Google Fit by subcategory in the health and fitness category  
 
  
Apple Health Google Fit Apple Health II Google Fit II
(Sep 17, 2014) (Oct 28, 2014) (Sep 16, 2015) (Nov 19, 2015)
1 (Fitness) Running/walking/cycling Affected Affected Affected Affected
2 (Fitness) Physical workouts/training Affected Affected Affected
3 (Health) Food/nutrition Affected Affected Affected
4 (Health) Sleep Affected Affected Affected
5 (Health) Women's health Affected
6 (Health) Hydration Affected
7 (Health) Medical Affected Affected
8 (Health) Body measurement Affected Affected Affected Affected








Table 3.5: Summary statistics 
 
  
Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 1 2 3 4 5
1  ln (downloads) 398,854 2.293 2.377 0 10.786 1
2 Affected group 398,854 0.542 0.498 0 1 0.004* 1
3 After intra-platform envelopment 330,576 0.798 0.401 0 1 -0.035* 0.025* 1
4 App price 398,534 1.483 2.664 0 49.99  -0.234*  0.037* -0.001 1
5 In-app purchse 398,854 0.273 0.446 0 1  0.185*  0.044* 0.002 -0.166* 1
6 Developer experience 398,854 30.675 90.334 0 1035 -0.047* -0.067* 0.005*  0.013* -0.028*








Table 3.6: Regression results  
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV: ln (downloads) Pooled data Apple iOS only Google Android only
Affected group * After intra-platform envelopment -0.166*** -0.312*** 0.349***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.112)
Platform - Week FE YES YES YES
App FE YES YES YES
Observations 331,882 236,544 95,338
Groups 5,002 3,696 1,306
R-squared 0.754 0.724 0.806
Notes: Robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the app level. A constant is included but not reported.  











Free Paid Basic features Advance features Novice Seasoned
DV: ln (downloads)
Affected group * After intra-platform envelopment -0.312*** -0.027 -0.177*** -0.471*** 0.083 -0.375*** -0.092
(0.049) (0.068) (0.054) (0.054 ) (0.102) (0.056) (0.098)
Platform - Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
App FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 236,544 117,248 119,296 169,408 67,136 188,160 48,384
Groups 3,696 1,832 1,864 2,647 1,049 2,940 756
R-squared 0.724 0.724 0.710 0.714 0.718 0.725 0.718
Notes: Robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the app level. A constant is included but not reported. 
           *** at the 0.01 level of significance, ** at the 0.05 level of significance, * at the 0.1 level of significance
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4











Free Paid Basic features Advanced features Novice Seasoned
DV: ln (downloads)
Affected group * After intra-platform envelopment 0.349*** 0.674*** -0.009 0.468*** 0.0007 0.301*** 0.264
(0.112) (0.200 ) (0.079) (0.136) (0.200) (0.113) (0.427)
Platform - Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
App FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 95,338 50,005 45,333 71,905 23,433 72,927 22,411
Groups 1,306 685 621 985 321 999 307
R-squared 0.806 0.745 0.687 0.795 0.826 0.824 0.747
Notes: Robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the app level. A constant is included but not reported. 
           *** at the 0.01 level of significance, ** at the 0.05 level of significance, * at the 0.1 level of significance
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4





HOW COMPETITION SHAPES INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES TO ADOPT 
INNOVATION: RIVALRY IN DIGITAL PLATFORMS  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Apple App Store opened in 2008 and has grown to be a dominating force in the 
modern economy. Since its launch, thousands of entrepreneurs have used the Apple App 
Store as a platform to offer a plethora of new products to customers. The success of these 
fledging companies is subject to the strong institutional forces that Apple as a platform 
owner exerts on their business. One of the increasingly important categories are health 
and fitness apps that compete on providing customers with ways to improve and track 
their health and wellness. In late 2014, Apple, in light of growing attention to and 
importance of health and fitness apps, launched its own health app called Apple Health. 
Apple also made the Health-related innovation available to its app developers by 
releasing Apple Healthkit – an innovation that enables app developers to integrate with 
Apple Health and to take advantage of tracking and cross-app integration features 
available in Apple Health.  
 Entrepreneurs in the Apple mobile platform were now faced with a choice: should 
they adopt Apple Healthkit or not? After a year, it became clear that despite Apple’s 
pressure, only a few app developers adopted the Apple Healthkit. Why? How can we 
explain this non-adoption by platform entrepreneurs despite strong institutional pressures 




on the dynamics of digital platforms but also raises an important question for institutional 
theory.  
 Institutional theory predicts that platform entrepreneurs, given strong institutional 
pressures, would adopt the innovation brought by the owner of the platform in order to 
increase legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1987). In particular, when the innovation is introduced by a power-holder who sets the 
“rules of the game” of a given institution (North, 1991; Scott, 1995), the institutional 
rule-setter exerts coercive forces on the rest of the institutional actors who do not want to 
be penalized or ruled out from the institutional environment. An increasing level of 
adoption by institutional actors are likely to result in increasing normative and mimetic 
pressures, which contribute to accelerating adoption (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal 
et al., 1997). Hence, from the perspective of institutional theory, adoption is the baseline 
expectation.  
 In contrast to institutional theory, addressing the question from the perspective of 
the strategy literature would generate different predictions about platform entrepreneurs’ 
actions. Strategy scholars argue that one of the central forces that shape firm behaviors in 
the market is competitive rivalry. A firm is in quest for a competitive position in the 
market vis-à-vis rivals to avoid competition and capture a larger share of value (Chen, 
1996; Porter, 1980, 1985; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). In this regard, the adoption of 
innovation into a given product can directly affect the market position of the product 
because it can change the attribute and value of the product offering. The propensity of a 




product competitive position against rivalry products in the market. For instance, a firm 
in the market is more likely to adopt innovation if adoption can enhance its product 
competitiveness vis-à-vis competitors. Conversely, adoption likelihood is expected to 
decrease if adoption does not help, or rather dampen, its product competitive position as 
compared to rivals in the market.  
 Despite the potential importance, there has been little scholarly work that 
examines the interrelationship between competitive rivalry and institutional pressures in 
driving the adoption of innovation. An explanation for this omission might be the settings 
and kinds of adoption that institutional scholars have traditionally studied. In particular, 
they have not examined adoption in institutional environments where the adoption of 
innovation directly shapes competition among rivals. Much of the existing research has 
tended to focus on managerial or administrative innovations, such as total quality 
management (TQM) (Westphal et al., 1997), civil service reform (Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983), ISO 9000 quality certificates (Guler et al., 2002), electric medical records (EMR) 
in hospitals (Angst et al., 2010), enterprise resource planning (EP) systems (Liang et al., 
2007), or Quality Circles (QC)/business process reengineering (BPR) (Freitas, 2008). 
That is, the existing literature has focused on process innovations, which might increase 
organizations’ efficiencies. However, institutional scholars have paid less attention to the 
adoption of product innovations, which could shape the market position of the product.  
 The present paper extends the existing literature by incorporating competitive 
rivalry into institutional theory to develop more nuanced perspectives on innovation 




adopt and where innovation adoption can directly shape a focal product’s competitive 
position in the market. Specifically, I focus on two forms of competitive rivalry: first, 
competitive rivalry between firms who compete to sell each product offerings to the same 
customers in the same institutional environment, and second, competitive rivalry between 
firms and the institutional rule-setter who controls the institutional environment. I explore 
1) how competitive rivalry between firms that compete in the same market affect the 
propensity of innovation adoption, and 2) how competitive rivalry between firms and the 
rule-setter of a given institution affect the propensity of innovation adoption.  
 I investigate these issues in a study of digital health and fitness ecosystem for 
platform entrepreneurs – that is, health and fitness mobile apps in the U.S. Apple App 
Store. This is an extreme case (see Eisenhardt, 1989), which can serve as a fruitful 
context to explore new theoretical mechanisms. In the health and fitness mobile 
ecosystem, there are both intense competitive rivalry and high institutional pressures. In 
this setting, I find that competition primarily discourages innovation adoption. More 
specifically, prior adoption by peer rivals has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the 
propensity of innovation adoption where a decreasing curve is driven by the force of 
competitive rivalry to be different from competitors. Also, competitive threat from the 
institutional rule-setter is negatively associated with innovation adoption.  
 The present paper contributes to several research streams. First, this paper 
integrates institutional explanations of adoption with insights from competitive dynamics 
research. My findings extend a burgeoning attempt to combine institutional theory with 




rivalry to fight for a different position against competitors is an important construct in 
strategy literature, there have been few scholarly attempts to systematically examine the 
interplay between competitive rivalry and institutional pressures in the process of 
innovation adoption. This paper addresses this void by conceptualizing and providing a 
detailed empirical evidence on this topic.  
 Second, this paper enhances our understandings of platform-based ecosystems. 
The existing literature in this area has focused on platform owners and their strategic 
decisions for platform success, leaving the dynamics of other participants, including 
platform entrepreneurs, unexamined. This study investigates the strategic behaviors of 
platform entrepreneurs within the platform ecosystem, adding to a small but growing 
body of platform research that shifts attention to the producers of complementary 
products (e.g., Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Rietveld and Eggers, 2017). Further, this 
study enriches the interdisciplinary approach in platform studies by being one of the first 
papers to study platform ecosystems from the perspective of organizational theory.  
 Lastly, this paper contributes to the literature on competition. Prior studies, which 
have addressed the relationship between competition and adoption, have shown mixed 
evidence for whether and how competition shapes innovation adoption. This is partly 
because these studies have used competition in subtly different and interdependent 
manners (Barney, 1986; He, 2015). By integrating institutional explanations into 
understandings of competitive dynamics, I carefully parse out the effect of competition, 
and offer a detailed theoretical and empirical account of how competition discourages the 




4.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
4.2.1 Institutional drivers of adoption  
Institutional scholars (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) have long 
pointed to institutional pressures to gain legitimacy as an important driver of innovation 
adoption in highly institutionalized environments. According to this explanation, 
adoption can either be brought by coercion from powerful institutional forces who control 
the “rules of the game” of the institution (Scott, 1995) or from social pressures to 
conform, exerted by other institutional participants such as peers that compete in the 
same market or consumers (Forstenlechner and Mellahi, 2010; Terlaak and King, 2007). 
Some scholars have even attempted to disentangle the type and variety of these 
institutional pressures to gain legitimacy, focusing on one particular type among others, 
such as mimetic isomorphism or normative pressures only in their study (e.g., 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Paauwe and Boselie, 2003). However, regardless of 
these different sorts of institutional pressure types, institutional theorists stress in 
common that concerns for legitimacy should be accounted for as a crucial driver in 
innovation adoption.   
 However, institutional scholars do not dispute the role of other factors, such as 
economic or efficiency concerns, in the adoption process (Palmer et al., 1993). They have 
sought to explore conditions under which concerns for legitimacy are further 
strengthened or rather weakened. The first stream of research at this intersection has 
taken into account the timing of adoption and investigated whether and how concerns for 




and Fiss, 2009; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). For instance, Tolbert and Zucker (1983), in 
their seminal paper on civil service reform adoption, argue that adopters place a higher 
emphasis on the technical value of innovation in the initial stage of the adoption process, 
and that legitimacy drives adoption in the later stage. Extending this perspective, some 
scholars have acknowledged that adoption can even take different forms, varying by 
adoption stages (Ansari et al., 2010; Fiss et al., 2012). For example, Westphal et al. 
(1997) found that the early TQM adopters, who are motivated by efficiency gains, tend to 
customize innovation while the late adopters, who are motivated by legitimacy gains, are 
likely to adopt the normative form of innovation.   
 Another burgeoning stream of research has integrated institutional accounts with 
strategic management literature (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Scholars in this line of 
research stream have acknowledged the role of agency in driving adoption, and have 
viewed adoption as part of a strategic decision process. These researchers have examined 
various internal and external factors that shape responses to institutional pressures. For 
example, Young et al. (2001), in their study of TQM adoption, found that the adoption of 
TQM hinges upon different attributes of top management teams, such as director’s age, 
director’s tenure, director’s education, and director’s prior exposure to the innovation. 
Kostova and Roth (2002) studied how institutional contexts that an adopter is embedded 
in, influences adoption likelihood in their adoption study of multinational corporations 
(MNCs). They find that institutional characteristics of a host country that each MNC 
subsidiary is located in, result in different adoption patterns of the same innovation across 




 In short, institutional scholars have sought to identify a variety of factors that can 
influence the extent to which legitimacy drives innovation adoption.  
4.2.2 How competitive rivalry shapes institutional pressures  
As noted, scholars have recently integrated several concepts from the strategy literature 
into institutional theory. However, scholars have yet to consider how competition might 
shape institutional adoption processes; more specifically, less is known about how 
competitive rivalry shapes responses to institutional pressures and how this interplay 
alters the adoption process. This is surprising given that competition is a key construct in 
strategic management.  
 Although institutional scholars have not examined the role competition plays in 
innovation adoption, scholars from economics have investigated the role of competition 
in innovation adoption. The findings of these studies remain inconclusive. Some scholars 
have found positive effects of competition on the adoption of innovation (Farrell and 
Saloner, 1985; Hannan and McDowell, 1987; Romeo, 1975), others have found negative 
effects (Hoppe, 2002; Levin et al., 1985), and others again have found insignificant 
evidence (Colombo and Mosconi, 1995; Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993). This is partly 
because these studies have relied on subtly different concepts and interpretations of what 
“competition” is, which confounds the effect of competition on innovation adoption. For 
instance, many studies have tended to measure competition differently: e.g., the 
Herfandahl index (HHI), the number of market players, the variance of firm size, or prior 
adoption. Also, they interpreted the mechanisms of competition differently. For example, 




that market rivals put on a focal firm to take on the same actions as peer rivals in order 
not to lag behind or miss out opportunities (Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Reinganum, 1981). 
That is, they have examined whether the adoption of an innovation by peers shapes the 
adoption by the focal firm. This argument and measure is very similar to the argument by 
institutional scholars that increased legitimacy and mimetic isomorphism stimulates 
innovation adoption that then spreads throughout the institution (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Guler et el., 2002; Westphal et al., 1997). In contrast, other economics scholars 
have theorized that when peers adopt an innovation, it dampens the profitability accrued 
from the adoption of the innovation by subsequent firms (Hoppe, 2002; Mulligan and 
Llinares, 2003). These scholars therefore theorize that prior adoption has a negative effect 
on subsequent adoption.  
 Even in the economics literature, studies have not examined these two different – 
apparently mutually-opposing – mechanisms of competition together within the same 
paper. The result is that the empirical effects of competition effects on innovation 
adoption are ambiguous. In this paper, I suggest that both institutional pressures and 
competition operate at the same time and that by parsing out both of these mechanisms, I 
can account of the contradicting findings in the current literature. Interestingly, Geroski 
(2002) theorized that both institutional and competitive pressures can exist 
simultaneously, but this relationship has yet to be examined empirically.  
 In particular, given that competition has been defined in multiple ways in 
economics (Barney, 1986: p791), I focus on the concept of competition from the strategic 




firm’s strategic consideration in their quest for a competitive position vis-à-vis rivals. The 
underlying stance of the strategic management literature is that a firm is inclined to avoid 
competition and to different from rivals in order to appropriate a larger share of value. 
For instance, higher rents are expected to be extracted in markets with lesser degree of 
competition than highly competitive and fragmented markets (Bain, 1951). Furthermore, 
even within the same market, strategy scholars argue the importance of securing a unique 
market position that does not overlap with that of rivals as a crucial source for superior 
performance (Porter, 1980, 1985).  
 Following this line of reasoning, I argue that the adoption of innovation is a 
strategic consideration that can be used to avoid competition. The adoption of innovation 
into an existing product can affect the attribute and value of a focal product’s offerings, 
and hence (re)shape a competitive positioning of the product vis-à-vis rivals in the 
market. In particular, in the case where the innovation of interest is widely available and 
accessible to all the competing firms in the market, adoption decision ought to be more 
mindful of whether and how this adoption can enhance (versus hinder) the 
competitiveness of the focal product as compared to that of competing rivals. The 
likelihood that a firm adopts the innovation into its product will increase if adoption is 
expected to help the focal product to move up the ladder in competition in the market. 
Conversely, adoption will decrease if adoption impairs the focal product’s competitive 
position. These nuanced roles of competitive rivalry in adoption can bring about 
heterogeneous responses to institutional pressures, thereby affecting the institutional 




Competitive rivalry between institutional actors in the market  
Two forms of competitive rivalry can arise and matter in adoption decision. The first is 
competitive rivalry between peer rivals, which comes from the fact that peer competitors 
who directly compete in the market are also at a risk set of adopting the same innovation. 
Innovation adoption by peer rivals who compete for the same customers can pose two 
opposing forces on the propensity of a focal firm’s adoption of the same innovation: a) 
institutional pressures that relate to the benefit of increased legitimacy, and b) 
competitive rivalry that relates to the cost of increased competitive tension to achieve a 
differentiated advantage from adoption against rivals. 
 At very low levels of adoption by peer rivals, a focal firm experiences little 
institutional pressures to adopt, because social norm that takes adoption of that 
innovation for granted is unlikely to be formed at the initial stage of the adoption process 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal et al., 1997). A gradual increase in adoption among 
peers starts to transform this adoption as a social process, which subsequently signifies 
concerns for legitimacy and pressures other remaining firms in the market to adopt the 
same innovation into their products. However, a marginal gain from each additional 
adoption contributes less to the level of legitimacy, as it builds upon the prior adoptions 
that have been previously established.  
 At the same time, the opposing force is also at work as with increase in adoption 
by peer rivals. At very low levels of adoption by peer rivals, the likelihood for the 
adoption to render a product competitiveness obtainable from a given innovation is 




peculiar innovation adoption is likely to be minimal given scarcity of adoption made in 
the market. However, as adoption by peer rivals increases, a marginal gain obtainable 
from a given innovation that can result in a differentiated advantage is likely to decrease. 
Each additional adoption made by competitors will pose an increasing amount of threat to 
the possibility that a focal product achieves a competitive advantage from adoption vis-à-
vis rivals.    
 Figure 4.1 illustrates these opposing mechanisms at work in the adoption process, 
which exhibits an inverted U-shaped curve. At low levels of adoption by peer rivals, a 
marginal benefit curve of increased legitimacy lies above a marginal cost curve of 
increased competitive rivalry, in which adoption likelihood continues to increase. 
Conversely, at high levels of adoption by peer rivals, a marginal cost curve of increased 
competitive rivalry lies above a marginal benefit curve of increased legitimacy, in which 
adoption likelihood is likely to decrease. It follows,  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between adoption 
by peer rivals and the likelihood that a focal firm will adopt the innovation into its 
product. 
Competitive rivalry between institutional actors and an institutional rule-setter  
A second form of competitive rivalry can come from a rule-setter of a given institution – 
i.e., an influential actor who holds the power to control the institution. In many cases, a 
rule-setter of the institution often serves a dual role within the institution: first is to set the 
“rules of the game” of the institution by introducing guidelines, practices, and 




institutional actors as market player. These cases are observable in the context of the U.S. 
life insurance industry (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008; Gruber and Simon, 2007), 
broadcasting industry in Japan and South Korea (Ishibashi and Matsumura, 2006), and 
the U.S. electric utilities industry (Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1986). For example, Brown 
and Finkelstein (2008), in their study of the U.S. insurance industry, find that the U.S. 
governmental body who released a set of insurance policies and legislations relevant to 
the entire industry, also offered its own insurance services, the latter of which are found 
to crowd out the market demand of private insurances. This hints at competitive tension 
that might linger between a rule-setter of the institution and the rest of the institutional 
actors when the former engages in the market as another competing force in the market.   
 Hence, when the innovation to adopt is introduced by a potential rivalry force as 
well as a rule-setter of the institution, a focal firm will face another strategic dilemma as 
to whether to adopt the innovation. The baseline expectation from institutional theory 
would be that a firm feels pressured to adopt what is introduced by a power-holder in the 
institution (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1991). However, competitive threat from 
the rule-setter as a direct rival to compete for the same customers, will put a brake on the 
directionality and magnitude of the baseline institutional pressures.  
 More specifically, the higher degree of competitive threat the product of the 
institutional rule-setter poses against the product of a focal firm, the less likely the firm is 
to adopt the innovation introduced by the rivalry force. This is due to the concern that 
adoption might rather help enhance the competitive positioning of the rival product of the 




competitiveness of its product in the market. Therefore, I argue that the baseline 
expectation of a high rate of adoption likelihood that is driven by concerns for legitimacy, 
will go down as with increase in degrees of competitive threat posed by the rule-setter of 
the institution as a direct rivalry force in the market.  
Hypothesis2 (H2): There is a negative relationship between degrees of competitive 
threat posed from the product of a rule-setter of the institution and the likelihood 
that a focal firm adopts the innovation into its product. 
 
4.3 DATA AND METHOD  
4.3.1 Digital platforms: U.S. health and fitness app ecosystem  
My empirical setting is the health and fitness app ecosystem in the U.S. Apple App Store. 
This context provides an ideal setting because it has both high degrees of institutional 
pressures and intense competitive rivalry. First, this app ecosystem is a highly 
institutionalized environment. The owner’s power in a given platform tends to be strong 
because the owner sets the rules of engagement and exerts a great amount of influence 
within its platform (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). The degree to which the platform owner 
exerts power over the rest of its platform participants vary by platform, depending on the 
platform’s choice of governance policies and architecture (Boudreau, 2010; Parker and 
Van Alstyne, 2017). Typically, the more closed and central-controlled the platform is, the 
greater amount of power and influence the platform owner holds over the rest of platform 




where institutional pressures in regards to what Apple (the owner) introduces into its 
platform is strong (Kenney and Pon, 2011).  
 Second, there is intense competition in this market. The category of health and 
fitness has grown faster than the average app category, drawing a large number and a 
variety of apps and app developers into this space. This leads the health and fitness app 
ecosystem to be highly competitive and fragmented without a single player or only a few 
players dominating the market. In such hyper-competitive environments with a large 
number of players, it is not easy to secure a different market position from that of rivals. 
Even a single decision to adopt one peculiar technology or innovation can be important, 
as it might pose threat (or opportunity) to change the competitive positioning of the focal 
product. Further, competitive tension in the market comes from multiple levels. 
Competition not only occurs among competing products developed by 
independent platform entrepreneurs who develop applications, but also from the platform 
owner (i.e., Apple). Apple serves not just as a rule-setter of the Apple App store, but also 
as a market player who directly competes against third-party applications. As mentioned 
earlier, one salient example of such a dual-role was Apple’s release of Apple Health in 
2014. The main features of Apple Health, to greater or lesser degrees, directly competed 
against the existing health and fitness apps in the Apple App Store. Yet, Apple also made 
this Health-related innovation available to the rest of its platform entrepreneurs by 
releasing Apple Healthkit, an innovation that enable third-party developers to access and 





4.3.2 Data sources  
I constructed a unique quantitative dataset from multiple sources, combing the 
proprietary data that I obtained from a specialized mobile analytic company with other 
data that I gathered by manually collecting and web-crawling from the app store and 
other archival sources. My sample contains the Top 1,500 health and fitness apps from 
July 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015. After deleting observations with missing data, the 
final sample includes 3,279 apps and 48,449 observations, and my unit of analysis is at 
product-month level.    
 In addition, as a supplementary analysis, I conducted dozens of semi-structured 
interviews with app developers and industry experts, and qualitatively analyzed archival 
data such as business press releases and online forums to better understand the context 
and nature of the industry and to triangulate my findings.  
4.3.3 Method and variables  
I employ event history analysis, specifically a Cox Proportional Hazard model (Cox, 
1972) to test my hypotheses. Event history analysis estimates the time it takes for a 
specific event to occur. In my case, the event is a firm adopting Apple Healthkit into its 
product. The hazard function is interpreted as the likelihood that a firm adopts Apple 
Health at a given time t. Because there is no theory that suggests a specific functional 
form of hazard function, a Cox hazard model which does not make any presumption 
about a particular shape of hazard function is appropriate for this study. As seen in the 




h0(t) at time t and the effect of observed X covariates. All time-varying covariates are 
lagged by one month t-1. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to 
account for interdependence between observations from the same firm21.  
h(t)=h0(t)exβ 
Dependent variable. My dependent variable of interest is adoption propensity, which 
measures the likelihood that a focal firm adopts the innovation into its product. I compute 
this by recording the time a focal firm (i.e., app developer) takes to integrate Apple 
Healthkit into its product (i.e., mobile app). This variable takes the value of one if 
adoption occurs in a given month, and take the value of 0 otherwise.   
Independent variables. The first independent variable (H1) is adoption by peer rivals, 
which I measure as a count of the total number of rival products which adopt the 
innovation. The construction of this variable mirrors prior studies that have measured 
direct competitors as those that operate in the same product segment and compete for the 
same consumers (e.g., Chen, 1996; Hsieh and Vermeulen, 2014; Simon and Lieberman, 
2010). The health and fitness category can be broken down into subcategories based on a 
primary area of business – e.g., running apps, food/nutrition apps, mental health apps – 
see Table 4.1 for the details. The target consumers and key product features are likely to 
vary by subcategory. Hence, I define direct competitors as those who compete within the 
same health and fitness subcategory. I also include the squared-term of this variable to 
                                                          
21 I also cluster standard errors at the different level other than product, (e.g., firm-level and health and 




explore the inverted U-shaped relationship that I hypothesize above.     
 The second independent variable (H2) is competitive threat from a rule-setter of 
the institution. The intensity of competitive threat from Apple Health would not be same 
for all health and fitness apps. Apple Healthkit can work either as a substitute for or as a 
complement to third-party health and fitness apps, varying by degrees of rivalry force 
Apple product puts against them. One important proxy for the intensity of competition is 
whether the institutional rule-setter competes in the same product segment and for the 
same consumers. Apple Health did not encompass all subdomains of health and fitness 
upon its initial release. The variable, similarity in business area, is thus measured as 
whether a primary area of business that a focal product operates overlaps with that of 
Apple Health. The variable takes the value of one if the product’s main areas of business 
overlaps with what Apple Health targeted at its initial launch, and becomes zero 
otherwise.    
 However, unlike peer rivals, competitive rivalry from the institutional rule-setter 
is more nuanced and complicated. This is due to the dual-role that institutional rule-
setters serve in their institution. For example, in digital platforms, one of the most 
platform owners’ fundamental roles is to facilitate and smooth product development and 
operation for the producers of their complementary products (Boudreau, 2012; Rochet 
and Tirole, 2003). Hence, in the existing literature, the offerings from the platform owner, 
have largely been considered as complementary and beneficial for platform 
complementors. Some scholars even acknowledge potential spillover benefits that may 




consumer attention and demand (Li and Agrawal, 2017). Hence, the fact alone that 
owner-developed products operate in the same product segment, might not be enough to 
pose a competitive threat to other products in the same segment. Another dimension that 
intensifies the degree of competition is similarity in product features, based on the 
assumption that the degree of competitive intensity is proportional to the degree of 
similarity with competing products (Chen, 1996; Johansson and Keddy, 1991). The main 
features of Apple Health are as follows: a) keeping track of health and fitness activities, 
b) integrating with other health and fitness apps, and c) spanning boundaries across other 
subdomains in health and fitness. The variable thus takes the value of three if a focal 
product already had all of these key Apple Health features, takes the value of two if 
having two out of these features, taking the value of one if having only one, and becomes 
zero otherwise. To capture these compounding effects, competitive threat from an 
institutional rule-setter was measured, using two dimensions of similarity in business 
area and similarity in product features, which were subsequently combined in a 
multiplicative fashion.  
 Control variables. I control for several product-specific, firm (app developer) -
specific, and market-specific characteristics that may correlate with the likelihood of 
adoption. First, as product-level controls, I include app performance measured as the 
number of downloads in a given month. To account for skewness of distribution of this 
variable, I use the log-transformed value. I also include app quality and app installed-
base, measured as an averaged app review score app received from end users in a given 




addition, I include multi-homing to capture how dedicated and sensitive a focal firm to 
the Apple platform (versus other platforms). Multi-homing captures whether the firm has 
a similar version of a focal health and fitness app in another leading mobile platform, 
Google Play; the variable takes the value of one if they have, and zero otherwise.  
 To control for firm-specific characteristics, I include offline business that takes the 
value of one when the firm has an offline business segment while taking the value of zero 
otherwise. This variable captures the extent to which the firm is focused exclusively on 
the mobile app business. I also include firm size, a categorical variable (1-5) that 
measures firm size to control for the degree to which a firm has resources to react to 
platform-wide changes. Given that many of these firms are private, accessing the exact 
number of employees (the most common measure for firm size) is not available. I tracked 
the number of employees through multiple sources, including a firm official website, 
LinkedIn, Manta site, which provides the ballpark figures or range of employee 
information (e.g., employees 51-200). I also included the variable wearable which takes 
the value of one if a firm has a business that produces wearable devices and becomes zero 
otherwise. This variable captures the extent to which a focal firm focuses on digital 
health and fitness. Also, as Apple’s launch of Apple Health is viewed as a step forward to 
grow as a digital health hub along with the release of Apple Watch (Apple’s own 
wearable device), this variable can additionally capture the degree of competition 
intensity with Apple.  
 I also included a set of market-specific controls. I include health and fitness 




Additionally, following prior studies that consider competition at the market level as part 
of market structure (e.g., Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993; Levin et al., 1985, 1987), I 
control for industry concentration, which is estimated as Herfindahl index (HHI).   
 
4.4 RESULTS   
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for covariates. Table 4.3 
shows the results for the tests of H1 and H2. Model 1 only contains control variables, 
followed by Model 2 that tests H1. The coefficient estimates of adoption by peer rivals 
and its squared-term show a statistically significant inverted U-shaped relationship with 
the propensity of innovation adoption. The linear term is positively related to the 
dependent variable while the quadratic term is negative. The linear and squared terms are 
significant both at 1% levels, lending support to H1. This confirms that competitive 
tension from rivalry peers to fight for a competitive product position does discourage the 
adoption of the same innovation.  
 Model 3 explores the role of competitive rivalry from an institutional rule-setter. 
The coefficient estimate of the interaction term similarity in business area and similarity 
in product features shows a negative and statistically significant effect on the adoption 
likelihood. The fact that this negative effect becomes salient only when compounding 
both dimensions of similarity together implies that concerns for competitive threat from 
the rule-setter of the institution overtake concerns for legitimacy when the product of the 
institutional rule-setter manifests a strong sign of competitive gesture.    




4.4.1 Additional analyses for robustness checks 
I employ additional analyses to confirm whether my results are still robust to alternative 
specifications and even after controlling for alternative explanations.  
Validity of an inverted U-shaped function. I confirm the validity of inverted U-shaped 
form argued in H1. An alternative explanation might be that the relationship is not a U-
shape, but actually an S-curve, which we would have expected from some prior studies 
on innovation diffusion (e.g., Roger, 2010). Therefore, I additionally include a cube term 
of adoption by peer rivals into the model. The coefficient estimates become insignificant, 
showing that the relationship does not follow an S-curve. Also, I do not find support for 
the linear effect alone, which becomes insignificant when employing in and of itself.  
 In addition, following the recommendation by Haans and et al. (2016), I check 
whether the slopes at the ends of the data range are of the expected sign and of 
significance: that is, positive at the very lower bound and negative at the very upper 
bound. To do so, I conduct utest with Stata 14 version, a statistical test to confirm the 
validity of a quadratic function. Table 4.4 shows that the slopes at the extremes of my 
data range are of expected sign and statistically significant. Also, I confirm that the 
inflection point is located within the data range.  
 All of these additional analyses suggest the validity of an inverted U-shape 
relationship that I hypothesized in H1.  
Alternative model specification. I run the additional analysis with a different model 




adoption studies given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (e.g., Choi et al., 
2013; David and Strang, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007). I followed the similar steps as above, 
and as seen in Table 4.5, my results continue to hold consistent.    
Adoption by non-rivals. The sensitivity for a focal firm to achieve a competitive position 
vis-à-vis rivals from the innovation adoption is expected to be proportional to the 
intensity of competition with other players in the market. In other words, it will be 
highest for direct rivals while it will be minimal (even, disappearing) for non-rivals. If the 
relationship hypothesized in H1 still holds with non-rivals’ moves (e.g., those with very 
low level of competition with a focal product), this will invalidate my arguments for the 
role of competition. To account for this alternative explanation, I instead include 
adoption by non-direct rivals and its squared term. I calculate this variable by counting 
the number of adoption made in health and fitness apps whose primary area or business is 
least relevant to (that is, has the farthest distance from) that of a focal product in the 
model. The coefficient estimates of these variables (as seen in Model 1 in Table 4.6) 
become insignificant, suggesting that H1 is driven by competition mechanisms.  
Institutional pressures from offline environments. It is often the case that the institution 
a focal firm is targeting to enter, running their business, or selling their products is 
different from the institution that the firm is originally based in. Some institutional 
scholars argue for the role that institutional influence that a focal firm is headquartered in 
might play in affecting the firm’s behaviors (Hewett et al., 2003; Kostova and Roth, 
2002). In digital platforms, it is little disputable that institutional pressures that stem from 




Often, the origins of these individuals or firms producing platform complementary 
products are distributed across different nations, such as the U.S., European nations, or 
Asia. For instance, in my sample, app developers are based in 72 different nations. The 
extent to which social attention for and interest to Apple Health in offline environments is 
likely to differ, possibly affecting the process of whether and how a focal firm adopts 
Apple Healthkit into its product. In order to capture this potential heterogeneity, I 
additionally include social attention. The variable is measured by counting the record that 
a keyword “Apple Health” had been used in all major social media that Google Trends 
tracked by a given month in each country that an app developer was headquartered in. 
After controlling for social attention, my results stay unaltered as seen in Model 2 in 
Table 4.6. 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION  
The present paper investigates an underexplored topic in institutional theory – the 
interplay between institutional pressures and competition in the adoption of innovation. 
In particular, I examine how competitive rivalry shapes the directionality and magnitude 
of institutional pressures to adopt an innovation introduced by an institutional rule-setter. 
In the context of the health and fitness mobile ecosystem of the U.S. Apple iOS App 
Store, I find that competition generally discourages innovation adoption. Prior adoption 
by rival peers has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the likelihood of adoption. This 




competition. I also find that competition from the institutional rule-setter is negatively 
associated with innovation adoption.   
 My findings improve our understanding of the institutional theory. Institutional 
scholars have long claimed that institutional pressures is the main driver of innovation 
adoption (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal et al., 2997). 
A growing number of scholars, in attempts to integrate institutional theory with the 
strategy literature (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995), have sought to identify factors 
that shape heterogeneous responses to institutional pressures. On the one hand, some 
have explored organizational-specific characteristics, such as organizational affiliations 
(Sanders and Tuschke, 2007), organizational culture (Love and Cebon, 2008), and 
organizational diversity in business portfolio (Burns and Wholey, 1993). On the other 
hand, others have explored institutional-specific heterogeneity, such as different sorts of 
institutional pressures (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004; Paauwe and Boselie, 2003) or 
country-specific political and institutional factors (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Palmer et al., 
1993).  
 This present study adds to this growing body of research by pointing out another 
level of heterogeneity that accounts for the emergence of differences responses to 
institutional pressures to adopt innovation. My analyses indicate that the type of 
innovation deserves attention as a critical factor in the adoption process. As noted earlier, 
previous studies have tended to examine process innovations, such as managerial or 
administrative innovations, (e.g., Kostova and Roth, 2002; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; 




directly relate to product competitiveness that shapes the market position of the product 
vis-a-via rivals. Under this condition, the adoption of innovation might not necessarily 
incur competitive rivalry in the quest to achieve a competitive market position vis-a-via 
rivals. This can partly explain the reason that prior studies have paid little attention to 
competition and its interplay with institutional pressures in adoption studies. Instead, my 
analyses, in the context of product innovations, demonstrate that competition can shape 
institutional pressures. This finding expands the institutional adoption literature by 
introducing an interesting twist on the effect of institutional pressures on the adoption of 
innovation.  
 Furthermore, this study also enhances our understanding of the relationship 
between an institutional rule-setter and the rest of the institutional actors. In previous 
studies, the institutional rule-setter has been largely viewed as a coercive force, which 
stimulates adoption and isomorphism between firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Guler 
et al., 2002). My analysis shows that the institutional rule-setter can also discourage 
adoption. This suggests that the influence from the institutional rule-setter is not just 
simply encouraging, but rather more nuanced and complicated than what is presumed 
before.   
 In addition, this study contributes to the literature on competition. Scholars from 
economics literature have found inconclusive findings on the effects of competition on 
innovation adoption (e.g., positive effects: Hannan and McDowell, 1987; negative 
effects: Levin et al., 1983; insignificant evidence; Colombo and Mosconi, 1995). As 




that those studies have used, resulting in confounding effects of competition. Few 
attempts have been made to tease apart those competing effects of competition in one 
setting. By integrating institutional accounts into the theory of competition in one paper, 
the present study attempts to parse out competition effects. My finding that competition 
discourages innovation adoption, holds consistent across multiple relationships: first, for 
the relationship between the institutional actors in the same market, a risk set who 
confront the adoption decision, and second for the relationship between the institutional 
rule-setter and the rest of the institutional actors in the institution.   
 Further, this paper enhances our understanding of the platform-based ecosystem 
literature. The existing research on platforms has largely focused on platform owners and 
platform-to-platform competition while paying little attention to other platform 
stakeholders including the producers of complementary products (e.g., Cennamo and 
Santalo, 2013; Eisenmann et al., 2011; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). The present study 
explores this less explored entity in platform studies: that is, platform complementors and 
their competitive landscape within the platform. Also, many of platform studies have 
emphasized a collaborative relationship between platform owners and complementors, 
which is a key determinant for success in platform-to-platform competition. Platform 
offerings, which are used in order to attract platform complementors to a focal platform, 
are largely understood as beneficial for complementary products (Boudreau, 2012; 
Rochet and Tirole, 2003). The present paper, however, points out the possibility that 
platform owners can also ultimately threaten (not enhance) the competitiveness of the 




entrepreneurs who are more likely to be enticed to join platform-based ecosystem than 
established firms. This paper illustrates the potential dark-side of this market: the high 
intensity of competition, which can discourage innovation adoption, hampering 
entrepreneurs from leveraging the owner’s offerings to their advantages.  
  The present paper also offers important managerial implications. A large part of 
our modern economy is hyper-competitive (D’Aveni, 1994). In these markets, achieving 
a competitive position vis-à-vis rivals tends to be more challenging than in traditional 
markets, because a greater number of competing firms and products are likely to occupy 
all given positions in the market. Under these circumstances, a single decision to adopt 
innovation, in particular which can directly affect product competitiveness, can be critical 
to easily affect the maker position of the product and reshape the competitive landscape 
of the market. This implication about the importance of accounting for strategic 
interactions between competitive rivalry and institutional accounts is of particular 
relevance for entrepreneurs in platform ecosystems. This is because concerns for 
legitimacy might often overshadow competitive rivalry concerns for entrepreneurs who 
are more driven to platform-ecosystems due to labilities of newness and smallness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). The present paper, by shedding light on the possibility of “two-
faced Janus” that an institutional rule-setter might play as another rivalry force, raises 
awareness about this less recognized lesson.  
  However, as with other research, this paper has limitations. One of the limitations 
is the fact that this study is based upon a single industry, which requires a careful 




industries (e.g., other markets outside of mobile platforms or non-platform contexts) will 
be fruitful to identify conditions under which my results are consistent. Strategy scholars 
(Klepper, 1996; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975) argue the distinct roles that product 
innovations and process innovations play respectively in different stages of industry life 
cycle. Another interesting avenue for future study is to examine these two different sorts 
of innovations in one setting. More specifically, future study might explore how the 
interplay between competition and institutional pressures in shaping innovation adoption 
will vary along with the different phases of industry life cycle and the emergence of 
different types of innovations.   
 In conclusion, the present paper provides both careful theorizing and empirical 
evidence of how institutional pressures and competition – two key constructs in the 
literature of institutional theory and strategic management – interplay with each other in 
the adoption of innovation, as one of the early attempts in both fields. I hope that this 





















Running/walking/cycling GPS (sensor) tracking-activities related
Physical workout/training Physical class; training; workout-enhancing activities
Food/nutrition Calories or macro-nutrition related; meal-plan; diet programs
Sleep Sleep cycle; sleep inducing activities related
Woman health Fertility or ovulation tracking related 
Hydration Hydration level tracking; hydration inducing activities 
Medical Vital signs (e.g., blood pressure, glucose, blood alcohol content, body temperature); medical
Body measurement Weights; heights; body mass index; body fat measurement 








Table 4.2: Summary statistics  
No. Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Adoption by peer rivals 41.643 44.918 1
2 Similarity in business area 0.694 0.461 0.463 1
3 Similarity in product features 0.759 0.828 0.187 0.185 1
4 App performance 5.877 3.029 0.038 -0.021 0.216 1
5 App Quality 1.348 1.941 -0.001 0.006 0.186 0.439 1
6 App installed-base 11.421 104.354 0.005 0.029 0.133 0.175 0.162 1
7 Multi-homing record 0.175 0.380 0.060 0.0002 0.163 0.291 0.254 0.148 1
8 Offline business record 0.253 0.434 -0.079 -0.188 0.006 0.095 -0.0002 0.036 0.161 1
9 Firm size 1.996 1.340 -0.058 -0.165 0.115 0.236 0.091 0.104 0.182 0.552 1
10 Wearable 0.042 0.202 0.122 0.104 0.186 0.127 0.071 0.048 0.190 0.363 0.279 1
11 Health and fitness subcategory 4.513 3.143 -0.612 -0.855 -0.253 -0.008 -0.042 -0.039 -0.045 0.196 0.167 -0.106 1









Table 4.3: Cox-proportional hazard model  
 
DV: Adoption propensity Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
App performance 0.162*** 0.160*** 0.149*** 0.148***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
App quality 0.178*** 0.179*** 0.151*** 0.152***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043)
App installed-base 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0002* 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) -0.0001
Multi-homing record 0.249 0.250 0.157 0.147
(0.200) (0.201) (0.226) (0.226)
Offline business record -0.476* -0.469* -0.278 -0.262
(0.249) (0.248) (0.231) (0.230)
Firm size 0.099 0.095 0.037 0.031
(0.076) (0.077) (0.078) (0.079)
Wearable 0.095 0.119 -0.117 -0.084
(0.323) (0.323) (0.300) (0.301)
Industry concentration ratio 4.031** 6.218*** 4.603*** 7.064***
(1.593) (1.840) (1.636) (1.950)
Adoption by peer rivals 0.035** 0.041***
(0.016) (0.016)




Competitive threat from an institutional rule-setter - a)*b) -0.961*** -0.991***
(0.275) (0.283)
     Similarity in business area - a) 3.130*** 2.899***
(0.471) (0.571)
     Similarity in product feature - b) 1.701*** 1.721***
(0.256) (0.265)
Health and fitness subcategory dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 40,079 40,079 36,696 36,696
Likelihood ratio -2550.200 -2537.929 -2235.371 -2221.108
Note. Standard errors (in parantheses) are clustered at the firm level












Lower bound slope 0.041***
Upper bound slope -0.050***
Test for inverted U-shape (t-value) 2.58***
Note. *** p at the 0.01 level








Table 4.5: Logistic regression model  
 
DV: Adoption propensity Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
App performance 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.184*** 0.198***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.041) (0.047)
App quality 0.188*** 0.184*** 0.174*** 0.177***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.041)
App installed-base 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Multi-homing record 0.362 0.339 0.422 0.441
(0.223) (0.222) (0.327) (0.353)
Offline business record -0.607** -0.573* -0.547 -0.541
(0.298) (0.296) (0.341) (0.365)
Firm size 0.148 0.134 0.127 0.127
-0.091 (0.091) (0.111) (0.120)
Wearable 0.109 0.123 -0.183 -0.182
(0.371) (0.368) (0.449) (0.472)
Industry concentration ratio 4.392*** 5.813*** 5.092*** 6.584***
(1.534) (1.688) (1.744) (1.923)
Adoption by peer rivals 0.028** 0.042**
(0.012) (0.017)




Competitive threat from an institutional rule-setter - (a)*(b) -1.228*** -1.275***
(0.389) (0.405)
     Similarity in business area - (a) 3.971*** 3.782***
(0.683) (0.703)
     Similarity in product feature - (b) 2.376*** 2.471***
(0.443) (0.534)
Health and fitness subcategory dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 40,078 40,078 36,695 36,695
Likelihood ratio -1707.9815 -1696.484 -1483.547 -1470.351
Note. Standard errors (in parantheses) are clustered at the firm level




Table 4.6: Additional robustness analyses  
DV: Adoption propensity Main model Model 1 Model 2
App performance 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.147***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
App quality 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.152***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
App installed-base 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Multi-homing record 0.147 0.158 0.155
(0.226) (0.224) (0.227)
Offline business record -0.262 -0.284 -0.290
(0.230) (0.229) (0.234)
Firm size 0.031 0.038 0.059
(0.079) (0.078) (0.083)
Wearable -0.084 -0.106 0.002
(0.301) (0.300) (0.281)
Industry concentration ratio 7.064*** 4.426*** 7.029***
(1.950) (1.684) (1.941)
Adoption by peer rivals 0.041*** 0.041**
(0.016) (0.016)




Competitive threat from an institutional rule-setter - a)*b) -0.991*** -0.965*** -0.987***
(0.283) (0.272) (0.284)
     Similarity in business area - a) 2.899*** 3.128*** 2.910***
(0.571) (0.470) (0.571)
     Similarity in product feature - b) 1.721*** 1.702*** 1.719***
(0.265) (0.253) (0.267)








Health and fitness subcategory dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observation 36,696 36,695 36,695
Likelihood ratio -2221.108 -2235.320 -2215.659
Note. Standard errors (in parantheses) are clustered at the firm level






All of my three papers in this dissertation have explored competitive dynamics within 
digital platforms from the perspective of platform complementors. In particular, I focus 
on competitive dynamics among platform complementors who compete for the same 
consumers in the platform (Chapter 2), and coopetitive (cooperation-competition) 
dynamics between the platform owner and platform complementors (Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4).  
 My dissertation is one of the early attempts to examine platform complementors 
and their competitive strategies as a central tenet of the study. I provided detailed 
theoretical accounts by integrating with established management literatures from other 
disciplines of strategy and organization theory. Also another contribution of my research 
to platform studies is novel datasets that I constructed from multiple sources. My 
empirical setting is mobile platforms, which are one of the most exemplary cases to 
exhibit the vibrant competitive landscape of platform complementors in digital platforms. 
Empirically, I strived to employ a multitude of different empirical strategies to strengthen 
my quantitative analysis in each paper of my dissertation (e.g., fixed effects, difference-
in-differences, CEM matching, and event history analysis). Further, as a supplementary 
step, I was engaged with in-depth qualitative examinations, including extensive 
interviews with industry players, industry experts and platform scholars. In addition, I 
carefully analyzed qualitative accounts for extensive text analysis from archival data 




Apple and Google app stores, and mobile analytic sites, all of which helped me to further 
triangulate my findings and solidify my analyses.   
 Digital platform markets present unique structure and characteristics for platform 
complementors to compete, largely different from those of traditional markets. One 
peculiar attribute is that this market is very crowded with a large number of new entrants 
coming every month due to low entry barriers and low appropriability regime. This poses 
new challenges and opportunities for platform complementors, in which traditional 
strategies (e.g., pricing-based or innovation-based strategies) might not provide expected 
outcomes. Chapter 2 explicates in-detail those unique market characteristics of digital 
platforms, and suggests two product strategies that could garner a competitive advantage 
for platform complementors in this market. For example, I show whether and how 
imitation strategies, which have been under-explored in prior strategy literature, can be 
used as a strategic lever to enhance product performance in platform markets.  
 Another interesting attribute of digital platforms is the presence of the platform 
owner. The platform owner governs the entire ecosystem of its platform, as a “master”, 
setting the “rules of the game” (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). The type and extent of 
influence that platform owners exert over platform complementors, hence, are likely to 
shape the competitive dynamics of platform complementors. More specifically, strategic 
behaviors of platform complementors are highly interdependent on their relational 
dynamics with the platform owner. In this regard, I argue (in Chapter 2) one of the 
important strategies that can enhance performance, is the speed of agile reaction to 




 However, the role of the platform owner is not just constrained to the “master” 
who governs and manages its platform. The platform owner also directly participates in 
the platform as a competing market player who produces complementary products to the 
platform (Gawer and Henderson, 2009). This makes the relational dynamics between 
platform owners and platform complementors more nuanced and complicated. Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 investigate these intricate relational dynamics between the two parties in 
the platform, and explore how this affects strategies and competitive landscape of 
platform complementors. In particular, I offer detailed theoretical and empirical accounts 
of how competitive tension posed from the platform owner against its complementors a) 
affects the performance dynamics of platform complementors in Chapter 3, and also, b) 
shapes complementors’ strategic decision process of innovation adoption brought by the 
owner in Chapter 4.  
 Previous studies that have focused on platform owners and platform-to-platform 
competition (e.g., Cennamo and Santalo, 2003; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Rysman, 
2009), have paid less attention to such competitive threat that the owner poses against its 
complementors while highlighting complementary relational aspects between the two 
parties. My analyses find that the competitive tension from the owner is generally 
negative for both complementors’ market performance and their likelihood of innovation 
adoption. Further, I find that such negative effect is more nuanced and complex, in that 
the directionality and magnitude of the effect greatly vary by platforms – e.g., in 
particular, platform governance strategy and the specific manner in which the owner 




importance of carefully taking into account platform-specific characteristics when 
exploring within-platform dynamics.   
 All of these findings from my dissertation contributes to several streams of 
literature in management. The main contribution of my dissertation is to the platform 
research by focusing on an underexplored topic of within-platform competitive dynamics. 
In addition, as noted in-detail in each paper above, this dissertation also improves our 
understanding of the strategic management and organizational theory literatures: i.e., 
imitation literature (Chapter 2), coopetitive literature (Chapter 3), and institutional theory 
(Chapter 4). Also, considering that many players who join digital platforms as platform 
complementors, tend to be small entrepreneurial firms or individual entrepreneurs, this 
dissertation contributes to the entrepreneurship literature, particularly for studies on 
entrepreneurship ecosystem and entrepreneurial strategies.  
 In light of growing expectation that platforms continue to dominating our modern 
economy, there have recently been ongoing debates among platform scholars in regards 
to whether platforms are just interesting phenomenon where the exiting presumptions and 
theoretical arguments can be revisited or even platforms should be acknowledged as an 
emerging stream of theory. While I believe that my dissertation can contribute to the 
further enhancement and development of platform research, one fruitful area for future 
research would be to compare my findings into other settings that are different from 
mobile platforms. Mobile platforms are ubiquitous nowadays, growing as a salient 
example of digital platforms. Yet, given that the “Internet of things” have rapidly 




digital platforms, encompassing different parts of our market segments such as financing, 
education, and fashion-industry. Future study to explore the conditions under which my 
findings hold consistent in those different forms of new digital platforms, will be 
meaningful. Another interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate the 
relational dynamics between platform complementors and end users, another important 
party of platform stakeholders. In digital platforms, boundaries between complementary 
product producers and end users are often blurred. Given that many platform 
complementors are also individuals, end users of a given platform often participate in the 
platform as the producer of complementary products. In other words, there exists less 
clarity in terms of the division of roles between producers and end users, as prior studies 
have assumed. Future studies to examine how this blurred distinction affects the 
competitive dynamics among platform stakeholders within the platform will be 
interesting.  
   I look forward to seeing my dissertation serve as a foundation for future work on 
within-platform competitive dynamics and to enhancing our understanding of platforms 









APPENDIX A  
Appendix to Chapter 2  
Table A1: Additional regression analyses  
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ln (app age) -48.606** -47.992** -42.589** -41.435**
(19.880) (19.215) (17.651) (16.453)
App quality 26.904***  27.166*** 26.270*** 26.629***
(4.856) (4.957) (4.864) (4.973)
Innovation level 21.468* 25.283**
(12.903) (12.470)
New product development  4.679 5.533
(4.462) (4.523)






Ln (speed of reaction to the change by the platform owner) -83.491*** -84.471***
(15.635) (15.480)
Dummy for right-censoring -42.150 -34.614
(43.494) (42.238)
Constant 689.582*** 1285.03*** 661.939*** 1250.859***
(105.772) (136.754) (90.589) (122.627)
Developer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subcategory FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,447 1,447 1,471 1,471
R-squared  0.603 0.601 0.600 0.597
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the developer level are in paratheses
          *** at the 0.01 level of signifiance, ** at the 0.05 level of signifiance, * at the 0.1 level of signifiance








Table A2: Additional regression analyses 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2
Ln (app age) -3.566 -2.488
(18.712) (17.042)








Ln (speed of reaction to the change by the platform owner) -93.013**
(36.461)




Developer FE Yes Yes
Subcategory FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,471 1,471
R-squared 0.733 0.729
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the developer level are in paratheses
          *** at the 0.01 level of signifiance, ** at the 0.05 level of signifiance, * at the 0.1 level of signifiance









Appendix to Chapter 3  
Table B1: Mean comparison of the affected vs. controls  
 
  
The affected Controls T-test
App quality 0.6785 0.691 0.0130
Developer age 971.671 968.170 -3.501
In-app purchase option 0.238 0.238 0.000
App price 1.552 1.471 -0.080
App age 668.056 697.461 29.405
App downloads 10288.431 8019.246 -2269.1848
Observations 1,810 1,810









Table B2: Regression results  
 
  
Unmatched sample CEM-matched sample Unmatched sample CEM-matched sample Unmatched sample CEM-matched sample
DV: ln (downloads) (Pooled data) (Pooled data) (Apple iOS only) (Apple iOS only) (Google Android only) (Google Android only)
Affected group * After intra-platform envelopment -0.166*** -0.179*** -0.312*** -0.287*** 0.349*** 0.213*
(0.046) (0.051) (0.049) (0.055) (0.112) (0.128)
Platform - Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
App FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 331,882 239,933 236,544 172,992 95,338 66,941
Groups 5,002 3,620 3,696 2,703 1,306 917
R-squared 0.754 0.740 0.724 0.709 0.806 0.796
Notes: Robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the app level. A constant is included but not reported.  








Table B3: Regression results with time-varying controls  
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV: ln (downloads) (Pooled data) (Apple iOS only) (Google Android only)
Affected group * After intra-platform envelopment -0.170*** -0.315*** 0.334***
(0.045) (0.048) (0.106)
Contorls YES YES YES
Platform - Week FE YES YES YES
App FE YES YES YES
Observations 331,882 236,544 95,338
Groups 5,002 3,696 1,306
R-squared 0.757 0.726 0.813
Notes: Robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the app level. A constant is included but not reported. 
           *** at the 0.01 level of significance, ** at the 0.05 level of significance, * at the 0.1 level of significance
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